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I INTRODJCTION
As the extent to which wage payment plans have become dependent
on standard setting techniq e has increased, the old distinction between
wage payment methods has disappeared. Originally there was a very distinct
difference hetvieen piece rate and bonus or incentive system o:- aai hand and
time work on the other. However, with the increasing use of standards to
determine the daily work requirement of employees, regardless of the par-
ticular svstem o^^ remuneration used, this distinction has, to a large extent,
vanished. The use of time study and the strict enforcement of production
standards goes far toward the obliteration of this line of distinction fnat
previously lay between the systems that pay solely for results arid those that
pay ^or the tisie served. (1)
With the destruction of this distinction, the problems faced by
all production workers have becone increasingly similar. No longer is the
hourly worker free frm compulsion and "speed-ups" felt oy the v/orkers paid
on the basis of results. As a consequence, organized laoor has beomce in-
creasingly engrossed in this problem which affects its members so directly.
Each union has had to work out a definite stand to take on the issue. Many
managements give adied urgency to the need for deciding upon a specific
course to follow by their insistence that the techniques are solely manage-
ment's prerogatives and beyond the scope of collective bargaining. This
approach, labelled bv It. William Gomberg of the International Ladies' Gar-
1. Van Dusen Kennedy, Union Policy an d In centive Wage 'Method s (New York, 194.),
pp. 27-28.
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ment Workers Tnion "the exclusive ap roach," (1) is extreraely reiainis-
cent of the generally rejected coiiiaodity theory of labor. The degree of
correspondence tnay be readily recognized in its definition which stat.js
that techniques and resolution of problems arising from them are manage-
ment's prerogatives. (2) Obviously no labor organization can subscribe to
this theory, and hence must develop a counter tD it.
The concern of this st .dy is y;ith their methods of coping v/ith the
problems arising in administration of a policy toward time standards. y'l'hat
are the weaknesses labor finds in the methods used in setting standards?
'^S\vj do they exist? What is done to prevent these wekknesses fro;a working
hardships Jn the people for whom they are set? Is some form of participa-
tion needed for giving adequate protection? If so, to what extent must it
be in order to be effective? The answers to these questions reveal the
pattern of labor reaction to time study and its views on participation in
the determination of standards.
1. Wir iam Gomberg, "Union Interest in Engineering Techniques," Harvard
Business Review
, (Spring, 19A6), p. ^56.
2. Ibid., p. 556.
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Definition of Terms
The term "labor," as used in this study, refers to workers for-
mally organized into definitive labor organizations. It has been limited
to this extent for two reaaaia In the first place, the likelihood of discov-
ering a well defined policy origination from an unorganized group is so
slight that this study would be of little significance because of the
small number of occurrences. In the second place, because of the similarity
of interests, regardless of whether the workers are organized or not, the
point of view of the organized workers wojld a -pear to apply equally to
those who are not.
The term "participation" is used in a rather broad sense to
embrace la-.or's activities with reference to the setting of standards.
The possibilities are active or passive participation. The former carries
with it the assumption of some responsibility for the correctness of Lhe
various phases of the process of determining standards. This type is epi-
tomized by the situation that existed in the Cleveland garment industry
following World War I in which the union was actively engaged in every
phase of standard setting and shared the responsibility for them. The
latter, passive participation, indicateo that the .mion accepts no part in
the deter :.ination of the standard o/ther than the possible prescription of
minimum requirements for conditions and accepts its imposition .>nly after
some type of empirical testing has indicated that it is satisfactory.
The term "time standards" conforms to the generally accepted de-
finition, the time deter:fiined b - time study to be needed for a normal opera-
tor to perform a giver operation.
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Implications of Participation
Labor participation in the deterination of time standards is not
as cut and dried a situation as one might expect. In fact quite the con-
trary is true. There are certain aspects of the situation that have caused
many labor leaders to hesitate before accepting any responsibility in the
determination of these standards. As soon as labor gains the right to par-
ticipate in these determinations there are certain implications attached to
this acceptance that are quite distasteful. In the case of many local union
groups, they have caused them to refuse direct participation in management
wage setting activities, and merely retain the role of challenger in rela-
tion to scientific management methods. (1)
The major inference to be drawn from actiye participation is that
labor has accepted :nanagemer.t ' s view th t modern time study is a factual
measurement which should not be subject to bargaining, and consequently that
the problem of standard determination is one that can be solvad by mutual
deterination of objective facts. (2) The unions are quite vehement in
their denial of this implication. This denial does not represent a categori-
cal rejection of the use of t'me study in the determination of standards,
but rather a denial of the absoluteness with which management views the
results. Labor, to a certain extent, accepts time study as a .•'•seful tool
in the measuring or estimating of a reasonable day's work, but insists that
tViis acceptance of time study must not be confused with the acceptance of
1. Kennedy, TTni on Policy and Incentive Wage Methods , up. 150-15.1.
2. Ib.d., pp. 150-151.

-6-
all the claims of its practitioners, as its ^se might iaply* (1)
A variant of this view held by other labor leaders, is that the
stop watch is potentially one of the most effective tools in 4;roaiOting
labor-management cooperation; whether this potentiality is realized or not
depends on the methods employed in its use. If it is ..sed correctly, it
estabi ishes facts which carnot be controverted, and if improperly used
will yield results that can and often do lead to embittered labor-management
relationships. (2)
Another inference to be drawn is one that is particlarly trouble-
some to the local nion leaders and is based on the extreme difficulty of
taking an impartial view of production problems in the plant and simul-
taneously attending to the demands and interests of the membership of the
union. As soon as they share some responsibility for the rates and stan-
dards th t are imposed on the workers, they lay themselves open to grave
suspicion and criticism by the rank-and-file memberships of the anion on
the grounds that they are not looking out fcr their best interest and have
"sold out to the management." This accusation is apt to be levelled with
nothing more substantial for grounds than the workers' traditional pre,^u-
dice toward scientific management which makes anyone who accepts it suspect.
(5)
1. William Gomberg, "Wage Incentive Practices," Studies in Personnel Policy
1168.
2. Morris Cooke and Phillip Ivlurray, Organized Labor and Production (New York,
1940), p. 118.
5» Kennedy, Union Policy and Incentive Wage I.Iethods, pp. 150-151.
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The degree to which these id li cations apply varies according to
the extent to which the unions participate in the determination of the
standards. As might be expected, those v,'hich only take a passive part,
doing nothing more than challenging piece rates set by the employers, are
much less troubled by these implications and the reactions that they cause
than those who participate with management in the studies, the results of
which are considered to be the end-product of mutual determination.

II DETERMINATION OF TIME STANDARDS
"The methods of wage payment matter little compared with the me-
thod of determining the stadards upon which the wage is based." (1)
Modern management presents time avd motion st ,dy as the most eqAtable and
accurate process for determining these standards, characterizing it when
properly employed as a combination of techniques and procedures demanding a
trained and s;:illed personnel, f ill and carefjl preparation, and continuous
application with no motives but efficient industrial operation and just
compensation. (2)
In the determination of a time staridard there are three distinct
steps which must be taken before the definitive standard is obtained. The
first is tlie deter.riination of the selected time for each element by averaging
the times gotteii from the stop-watch study. The secjnd is the calculation of
the levelled time, which represents t .e time in which the average worker
would be expected to perform the operation. The third step is the appli-
cation of varioj.s allowances to this levelled time to take into account the
various delays of every type that might be expected to occur in the cycle;
the application of these allowances to the levelled time will >-ive the al-
lowed or standard time for the performance of the operation.
1. Cooke and I'urray, Organized Labor and Production , . 116.
2. Kennedy, Union Policy and Incentive Wage Methods, pp. 50-40.
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Selected Time
A discussion of selected time should really be subdivided into
two sections, one on the recorded time which is the time that is recorded
on the observation sheet as the result of observation, and the selected
time, which is the time that is decided is Jiost representative of the
time necessary to do the particular operation. This latter time is ar-
rived at in a variety of ways that will be discu sed later.
Since the recorded time is the basis of the allowed or stan-
dard time for an operation, it must be obtained with the utmost accuracy.
Strengthening the argument for the necessity for accuracy in obtaining
the recorded time is the fact that under normal circumstances the re-
corded time comprises 75^^ of the final result. Thus, be exerting a
great sta ilizing influence and forcing the variables into a small seg-
ment of the final result, it enhances the degree of consistency which may
be obtained from a time study. (1) This fact is acknowledged by both labor
and management so that in theory there is co^iplete accord on this point,
however in practice there is some disagreement on the method to be used
in obtaining this selected time. Labor insists on certain conditions and
methods that do not always coincide with the practice favored by manage-
ment .
The equipment to be used for a time and .riotion study is quite
standardized, the few variations that do exist being of no importance.
The fact that a stop-watch is to be used is .sually not questioned, that
it is to be a decimal rather than a split second watch is a matter of ex-
1. Ralph Presgrave, Dynamics of Time Study (New York, 1946), P. 52.
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pediency that is well recognized, whether it is to be a decimal minute
or hour watch is of no consequence since by the use of a conversion fac-
tor the readings obtained from these are, in effect/ identical
.
The board ;^or holding the watch and the observation sheet, and
the use of .vriting instrument and slide rule, and the foria of the obser-
vation sheet are details over which there is no disagreement.
The amount of data on the conditions surrounding the performance
of the operation is a mat-ter on which labor often expresses itself quite
positively. It feels that in order to avoid any argument after the stan-
dard is put into operation that very complete data should be assembled as
to the conditions extant at the time of the study— speed and feed of the
machine, the quality of the materials including some estimation of the quali-
ty as compared to v/hat might normally be expected, specifications to which
the ooerator must work, type of machine used, condition of the machine.
3y requiring this exhaustive compilation of conditions they obviate the
danger of too"tight" a standard being set because of unusually favorable
circumstances at the time the study was made. (1)
These precautionary measures wo Id be in vain if the method were
not carefully studied and recorded at the same time since a method change
after the standard was set would invalidate it just as much as a change in
the material or machine. (2) In order for the study to have any lasting
value, both the conditions and the methods must be recorded carefully so
that any deviation can be found and compensated for. Although these re-
1. Kennedy, Union Policy and Incentive Wage r^ethods , pp. 40-45.
2. Coolce and Murray, Organized Labor and Production
, p. 116.
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quirements are set fort-h b; labor, they are equally valid from management's
standpoint.
The question as to who shall be timed is one that has been point
of contention many times- between management and labor. I.'Iany time st idy
men seem inclined to the belief that a better than average operator should
be studied because of the fact that the skilled man is better for observa-
tion purposes than the average or poor one, since he is much less likely
to introduce variables that will have to be discarded wtien the computations
are made. (1) Psychologically this use of the better than average worker
is bad because many of the workers, not understanding that all standards
are adjusted to the capacity of the average worker, will feel that the
standard time will be so low as to be almost impossible of attainment for
him. The usual consequence of this feeling is the loss of the worker's
good will and cooperation. (2) To a certain extent this question has been
cleared up so that now it is generally agreed that the average vorker is
the one to be timed. This acceptance of the average worker as the one to
be timed is often base^"! not on the belief that he is the best one to be
timed but rather on the realization that the bad psychological effect of
timing any other 7>rorker is likely to be out of proportion to the importance
of the issue—although this is a pragmatic solution, since no basic tenet is
violated it is quite defensible, especially in view of the Aact that ell
times are levelled to the average worker anyiway. The reason that the bet-
ter than average worker is advocated by some time study authorities is that
1. Richard H. Landsbur^h end V/illiam R. Spriegel, I ndustr
i
b.1 r'er.a^ ement (New
York, 1945), p. 577-
2. Ralph Barnes, Motion and Time Study (New York, 1942), pp. 250-251.
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since his motions are uniform, his methods apt to be the best, and his
v'ork steady, he will be easier to time end r&te than an average worker
whose work standards are not as high. (1)
This agree:/ient as to the operator to time doesr't coiLpletely
solve the problerr: since there is still the necessity of deciding v/hich
of the '.orl.ers are average and hence eligible to be timed. The concept
of the average worker is rather vague and may easily become the subject
of controversy as was t'ne case in the Cleveland garment industry in 1925
when the labor time study engineer embodied in his report to the union a
criticism of the time study men's selection of the average vrorker, claim-
ing that the concept of the average worker was exceedingly vague and that
the workers selected were sbove average in efficiency. (2)
The need for too accurate a determination of this average worker
has been removed to a large extent by acceptance of the prinicple of level-
ling which adjusts the selected time to the level of the average worker re-
gardless of the efficiency of the operator observed. That this latter course
is being followed to an increasing degree may be seen by a study of repre-
sentative contracts for those industries where time study is used exten-
sively. In many of these contracts nothing is said abcut what operator is
to be timed, merely that the rates when set shall be within the' capacities
of the normal or average worker. The agreement between General lotors Corp.
and the International Union of United Automobile, Aircraft, and Agricultur-
1. Landsburgh and Spriegel, Industrial Management
, pp. 577-578.-
2. Sumner H. Slichter, i'nion Policies and Industrial Management C Washin k-ton,
D.C, 1941), pp. 405-410.
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al Workers (CIO) stipulates that t\'e iToduction standards shall be within
the reasonable working capacities of normal operators. (1) The Hood Rub-
ber Company agreement with the Rubber Workers Union Federal local ^-21914
(AFL) states the same thing. (2) The agreement between the Jones and
Laughlin Steel Corp. and the United Steel Workers of America merely states
that an appropriate rate will be established by the procedures regularly
used by the industrial engineering department. (5) The fact that no men-
tion is made of the operator to be timed indicates quite strongly the ac-
cpetance of the process of levelling or rating, which is a common proce-
dure used to obtain the amount of production to be expected from the aver-
age worker.
Two methods of timing with the stop-watch are comuionly used
—
the snap-back method, and the continuous method—each of which has its
pro onents. The snap-back method which involves snapping the watch back
to zero immediately after reading the elapsed time for each element, al-
though used by a large number of companies, is criticized both by labor
and opponents of this system among tijie study engineers. Its advocates
claim that by treating each element as a separate story that more time is
available to the time study man for analysis and rating of the element.
They further claim that foreign elements may be eliminated from the study
by stopping the watch during any period in which the operator is engaged
in doing anything but the elements of the operation; it is at this point
that the majority of the criticism of this method is aimed. Labor feels
1. "Collective Bargaining Developments and Representative Union Agreements,"
Studies in Personnel Policy ^'60 (1944), p. 40.
2. Ibid., p. 45.
5. Ibid., p. 29.
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that included in time study should be those elements that occur irregularly
in the cycle as well as those that are an integral part of it. (1) r:ot
only should these foreign elements and delays be included in the study, but
they should also be described accurately and included in the elements of
the operation if they occur with any regularity and are actually inherent
in the operation. ^2) The policy of just timing the elements that occur
in every cycle and placing all other elements in the allowance is considered
poor time study Practice. Fhillip Iv!urray and I.iorris Cooke take a more po-
sitive position and state that the continuous method is the one to be used
rather than just criticizing the snap-back method. (5) Another aspect of
the snap-back system that causes it to be held in disfavor is that, purely
from a mechanical standpoint, it makes the observer's task more difficult.
"At best, the observations require the utmost alertness and
concentration on the part of the time study man. The use of
the snap-back method, instead of the continuous method, makes
still greater demands upon his attention, which will natural-
ly affect the accuracy of his work." (4)
This is dt.ie to the fact that at the end of each element he must do three
different t' ings simultaneously—determine the exact point at which the ele-
ment is completed, make a mental note of the reading, and then snap the
watch back to zero. The greatest sources of error inherent in this are
those brought about by the necessity for returning the hand to -zero at the
termination of an element; in this category are such errors as the time re-
1. Kennedy, ^Tnion Policy and Incentive ''.'age Methods
, Pp. 40-49.
2. Herbert J. L'eyers, Simplified Time Study (New York, 1944), chap. 10.
Barnes, 'viotion and Time Study, p. 216.
5. Cooke and I.Curray, Organized Labor and Production
, p. ll?*
4. Stewart Lowry, Harold B. Maynard, and 3. J. Stegmsrten, Time and
I.'otion Study (New York, 1927), pp. 95-96.
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quired to return the hand to zero, and the tendency to snap the watch back
either before or after the completion of the element. (1)
The continucus method which is generally acknowledged to be the
most satisfactory method by both labor and management varies from the snap-
back in that the watch is allowed to run continuously either for the entire
length of the study or just for the cycle. In either case total elapsed
time for the period of the study is accounted for; no element, no matter
how foreign to the operation is omitted. V/hen an unusual element appears,
it is timed and noted on the study sheet. Later these foreign elements
are studied to determine whether they appear regularly and should be in-
cluded in the operation or whether they are chance occurrences which should
be taken into account in the allowances that are added to the study re-
sults. (2) In any event the omission of delay elements is precluded by
this method, and one possible cause of an excessively "tight" standard is
resioved. In addition to removing one of the major objections to stop-watcli
studies, this method has other characteristics which incline labor tc its
favor. By removing the necessity for snapping the watch back at the end
of each element, the errors attendant on this action are prevented, removing
another objection to stop-watch studies. The subconscious effort to achieve
consistency at the sacrifice of accuracy is defeated by the leaving of the
computation of the elapsed time till the end of the study and concentrating
on reading the watch during the obsarvaticri period. (5) Thus it may be
1. Ibid., pp. 95-96.
2. Ibid., pp. 95-96.
Robert Lee L'orrow, Time Stjdy and i^iOtion Economy (New York, 1946) p. IO5.
5. Lowry, L^aynard, and Stegmerten, Time and Motion Study
, p. 96.
I
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seen that by its nature the continuoua method possesses many virtues that
cause it to be preferred by labor.
In order to secure the selected time for each element in the
cycle, it is necessary to extract from the series of elapsed times that has
been collected, that tioie which is most representative of the series and
hence of the element under consideration. There are a number of methods
of obtaining this figure, some much more favored than others. Use of the
minimum tine in the series as the selected time is held in extreme disfa-
vor by labor. It is felt, with considerable justification, that the use
of this time is extreraely unjust to the worker, forcing him to work at a
pace which it is questionable that he ever achieved since in many cases
the extremes of the series are a result of the observer's error rather
than the worker's accomplishment. (1) Management justifies this minimum
time by mair.tainin^ that if a worker is capable of doing it once, he is
capable of doing it consistently. If this point of view is held, it is
incumbent upon management to discover the method by which it was attained
and teach it to the worker so that this minimum time will become the re-
presentative time for the accomplishment of that element. A variation on
the use of the absolute minimum time occurring in the study is the use of
the minimum time that occurs at least 10% of the time. 'Vhen thi-e system is
used, the allovfances for delays and fatigue are enlarged so that the result-
ant allowed time is identical with that which would be obtained by using a
selected time computed from some other basis. (2)
1. Kennedy, Union Policy and Incentive Wage Llethods
, p. 4i
-
2. I.'orrow, Robert. Lee, Time Study and I.'otion Economy , : . |©1 •
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Selected time is soaetimes arrived at by the use of "good time.
"
This is the tiaie value which, in the opinion of the analyst, is oiost re-
presentative of those in the series notwithstanding the fact that the arith-
metical average or mode may indicate a different one. There is a large ele-
ment of personal judgment in this value which leads labor to feel that the
possibilities of injustice to the worker are considerable. Because of this
element of arbitrariness, this ^lethod is seldom used for the deteriuination
of selected ti^ae. Keither this method nor the minimum method are generally
used because of the weaknesses stated above.
The most generally accepted methods for arriving at the selected
time are through the use of the arithmetic mean, uiode, or modal average,
the method used depending on the facts of the particular case in question,
or the preference of the analyst. (1) All of these systems are about
equally justifiable in view of the fact that in a hOK,ogeneous system they
all represent methods of deter.nining a representative value for a series.
Mr. William C-omberg, of the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union,
prefers the arithmetic mean, basing his preference on the law of large num-
bers which states that as the number of readings increase, the expected
value will come closer to the mean. (2) Since all of them are easily de-
fensible, there is little dogmatic adherence to one over another.
In all three cases mentioned above there are certain precautions
which must be observed in their application in order to retain their theo-
retical defensibility. When either of the modal methods is used, it is
1. Kennedy, Union Policy and Incentive Wage Methods , p. 46.
2. '.Villiam 3omberg, "Dhe Relationship Between the Unions and Engineers,"
Mechanical Engineering
,
(June, 19^5), p. 427.
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necessary to take a sufficient number of observations to insure the es-
tablishment of the mode. Use of the arithmetic average requires not only
that a sufficient number of observations be taken but also that extreme
care be exercised in discarding any values that a;pear to be abnormal.
What constitutes a sufficient number of cycles is primarily a matter of
personal judgment tempered, perhaps, by the dictates of ^ood statistical
procedure. Actually this is quite a reasonable approach to the question
because such factors as the skill of the operator, the number of elements
in the cycle, the consistency of the operator, the possible variation in
the length of the study, and the relation of machine time to handling
time exert such an influence over the number of cycles needed to arrive at
a true value. There io, of course, a certain amount of disagreement caused
by this vagueness, but it is by no means an irreducible obstacle, since there
are statistical laws of sampling which may be used as^gaide. (1)
Theoretically there should be no unexplained abnormal time values
because each is caused by an identifiable factor that should be recognized
and isolated at the time -^he -^'/ady is made. (2) Since time study men are
fallible they do appear in studies and present problems as to how they should
be treated. The great temptation is to reject all values that are apparently
abnormal; however, this practice is open to criticism because these abnor-
mal times are caused by factors that should be considered in arriving at
a selected time. It is for this reasm that many authorities advocate the
retention of all but the extreme abnormalities in the series whose arith-
1. William Gomberg, "Labor Examines Time Study Ivlethods," Industrial Engineer
,
(Karch, 1944), p 4.
2. Lowry, '.layiiard, and Stegmerten, Time and Motion Study
, p. IJl.
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metic mean is to be calculated. (1)
These selected element tiues are added together to give the
selected operation time which is the base figure used to compute the
standard tiirie for the operation.
1. Ibid., p. 151.
Barnes, I,lotion and Time Study , p. 208.
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III DETERMINATION OF TIlvE 3TA.NDARDS (Cont.)
Base Time
Probably the moat important step in the engineering part of time
study is determining the relation between the actual times recorded on the
observation sheet and those representative of a fair day's work. The time
study is hardly more than a detailed time card until, by application of a
rating or levelling factor, it is modified to represent the time • required
for a normal performance of the operation. (1) The application of this
correction factor permits the use of a single study to deteraiine the time
standard by converting the results of this study to a level of productivity
that might reasonably be expected from the average or normal worker. To
assure fundamental validity the factor should be based on an estimate of
the productivity of the worker in relation to some predeterjuined norm. (2)
Within this framework of basic validity its acceptance will depend on wheth-
er the estimate is the result of an unorganized guess or the result of care-
ful integration of carefully appraised factors. All of these subjective
correction factors exist in default of true statistical analysis.
"If it were possible to obtain a broad enough sam-
oling of any operation there would be no need for anything
but routine recording of time, for we could through this sam-
pling obtain a complete picture. . .without having to resort
to mathematical adjustment." (5)
The introduction of this wholly subjective element into what, up
to this point, has been an objective procedure has engendered considerable
1. Phil Carrol, Jr., Time Study for Cost Control (New York, 194^), pp. 6O-85.
2. Presgrave, Dynamics of Time Study, p. 62.
5. Ibid., p. 52.
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opposition frozi labor and has aiotivated it to ixiake various provisions in
theip- contracts to protect itself fro.n unreasonable standards resulting
from the application of these factors which they consider purely arbitrary.
One such protective provision is the stipulation that only the average woi<^
ter is to be studied; this removes the necessity for correcting the relative
productivity of the worker studied, and thus permits this objectionable fea-
ture to be dispensed with. Another such provision is the retention of the
right of review of all standards before they are put into effect on a per-
manent basis. There is some variation in the workings of this type of pro-
vision, some unions preferring to review the standard before it is applied
to the job, while others prefer to wait until the standard has been in ef-
fect for a short period before they pass on its reasonableness. This pro-
tection is provided for by some unions by setting up a definite grievance
procedure to be followed in the event that there is a disagreement over
the correctness of a standard. Of these various types of clauses only the
first is for protection from levelling or rating exclusively, the others
have wider application and are directed as much toward assuring that ade-
quate allowances are added to the levelled times as they are toward incor-
rect levelling factors.
There are two general methods in current use for the determination
of the base time which form the basis for a number of different systems of
expressing and applying the correction factor. The first of these is effort
rating or estimation of operator speed in relation to some predetermined
norm. Variation from this norm applied to the selected time as a correc-
tion factor gives the time in which an average worker would be expected to
perform the operation. Care must be taken in this method to construe effort
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30 that it is directly related to speed by carefully eliminating all ef-
fects of skill, method, and working conditions. (1) This restriction is
considered to be a major virtue of the system by Phil Carrol who maintains,
"Effort is the only criterion that should be con-
sidered in rating because all other factors have to do with
skill and effectiveness. To judge these latter factors re-
quires a technical skill which is not possessed by the aver-
age time study man." (2)
These factors are taken into account by other methods by people who are
properly qualified to deal with them.
Indorsement of this system of correcting the selected time de-
pends on the acceptance of three basic premises. The first is that the
speed of motion is a homogeneous quality that is subject to measurement
and capable of being expressed in numerical terms. The second of these
basic premises is that it is possible to assess this quality, speed of mo-
tion, by judgment in such a manner that the rules of measurement are adhered
to. The third of these premises is that the ability to measure dFfort can
readily be acquired by most people and used in the great majority of fac-
tory operations. (5)
The other general method of modifying the selected time to com-
pensate for the relative productivity exhibited by the worker studied is
termed levelling. This is distinguished from rating by the fact that it
is an attempt to measure the determinants of speed—skill, effort, condi-
tions, and consistency—rather than speed itself. Each of these factors
is graded and a numerical weight is assigned to each grade—either positive
1. Ibid., p. 81.
2. Carrol, Time Study for Cost Control
, p. 84.
5* Presgrave, Dynamics of Time Study , p. 81.
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or negative depending on whether the grade is above or below average which
carries a weight of 00.00. The grades for these factors are indicated dur-
ing the time of the study by means of letter symbols which correspond to
the various numerical v;eights that are used to deter;rdno the level at which
the operator was working. Care has been taken on these numerical v;eights
to keep the extremes within the range of individual differences of indus-
trial workers as worked out by David Wechsler and others. 3y thus setting
credible limits to the compensation that may be made, the strength of the
method is increased. (1)
Labor's reservation in accepting standards based on these pro-
cedures is understandable when the possibilities of unscrupulous manipula-
tion and innocent error are considered. From their standpoint the necessity
for the time study man to employ such a subjective concept as average in
arriving at e rating factor is a highly likely source of error. As long as
verbal definitions of average are used in lieu of statistical ones, there
will always be cause -^r doubting the accuracy of numerical terms that are
dependent on them because of the extreme difficulty in conveying absolute
meanings with words. (2) Notwithstanding that the error is unintentional,
it is still a cause of unfair standards and a reason to be on f;uard.
A potential source of unintentional error that must be considered
very carefully is the statistical basis of both rating and levelling. It
is not at all a certainty that this basis can be rationalized convincingly
or shown to conform to the rules of measurement; there are many who doubt
1. Ibid., pp. 70-85.
Lowry, I'aynard, and Stegmerten, Time and Motion Study
, P; .' II8-I25.
2. Presgrave, Dynamics of Time Study
, p. 65.
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that it can*
rot the least cause of this reservation is the ease with which
standards computed by means of these factors can be adjusted to suit the
desires of its users. The justification for this caution lies in the na-
ture of the process of arriving at these factors. At best they are a pro-
duct of t?ie observer's honest judgment, but since they are incapable of being
tested by any objective procedures, it is a simple matter to utilize them
as a means of adjusting stadards to any desired level.
Although recognition of these weaknesses of time study by labor
might appear to destroy its usefulness, this is not actually the case. It
does, hov/ever,
"establish a basis for a critical evaluation of the techniques 's
accuracy and make clear the great injustices which may be per-
petrated in the name of time study. " ( 1
)
V.ost of labor recognizes that faulty as its techniques may be, time study is
the best meth3d of deteruining a fair day's work that exists at present.
This being the case, they accept and take whatever precautions they can to
prevent being harmed by it.
1. William Gomberg, "Labor Exaa-nes T^ue Study i/.ethods."
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Standard Time
It ia generally acknowledged that there are a certain number of
unpredictable delays that will inevitably occur in the shop during the
course of a day's work. Some of these are avoidable it is true, but there
are a great number that cannot be eliminated. Within this latter group,
many of the individual delays are so minor that they do not warrant for-
mal accounting, yet taken in total represent a considerable length of time
which should be taken into consideration in establishing a time standard.
The addition to the base time of allowances for these delays is the method
by which the standard tiae is deterijined.
Allowances that are added to the base tine can be divided into
four main classes
—
personal, fatigue, unavoidable delay, and special. Al-
though these allowances are of vital interest to lahor, it is only possible
to consider one of them, personal allowance, in general terms. The particu-
lar operation and the conditions surrounding it deterJiine the amount of 'o'.LLLe
that is appropriate for the other allowances. Although the personal allow-
ance may be computed in terms of what the average person will require, even
this allowance must be adjusted to special circumstances when working con-
ditions are extremely difficult or the work is inordinately heavy. (1)
Fatigue in industry and consequently fatigue allowances are the
subject of much study and controversy at the present time. Very little is
actually kriown about counteracting the effects of fatigue. L^any experiments
have been conducted and theories developed concerning the cause, effect, and
steps requisite to-COmbat fatigue in industry, bat because of the variety and
1. Barnes, ?.:otion and Time Study
,
p. 280.
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inconaistency of the results it has been impossible to develop any stan-
dard practice for dealing -'ith it. Conseq.'ently , fatigue allowauices are
merely estiniates of the time that should be allowed to orevent undue ex-
haustion of the worker. At present, these estimates in lieu of sa^e more
objective basis are based on the changes of productivity of the -worker that
can be attributed to fatigue.
Allowances for unavoidable delay are those made for such things
as minor breakdowns in the machines, breakage of tools, receiving instruc-
tions, and unforeseeable delays of this nature. This allowance is usually
determined by studying the operation for a reasonable length of time and
then estimating the amount of time that should be added for these delays.
However careful the study may be, this method, in the last analysis, is a
subjective one with little statistical validity; as such it is open to
criticism. This criticism is especially justified because of the existence
of a technique, developed by R. L. Morrow, that is on firm ground from a
statistical standpoint, (l) This ratio-delay study, as I^orrow's procedure
is called, depends on the compilation of a reasonably large number of ran-
dom observations of whether the machine is operating or idle because of
some unavoidable cause.
"Then, as Tippet states, 'the percentage number (9f
readings that record the machine as working will tend to. equal
the percentage time it is in that state.'" (2)
The difference between this figure and one hundred per cent is the delay
allowance. This afproach to the problem of fixing upon the delay allowance
1. Gombegg, "The Relationship Between Unions and Engineers," p. k27'
2. Morrow, Time Study and Motion Economy
, p. I76.

is advocated by Mr. V/illiam Goraberg of the International Ladies' Garment
Workers Union. (1)
The last of the four allowances, special, is the least important
of the group. It is uiore or less a catch-all device used to compensate for
some peculiar circumstance surrounding a 30b. It is given to a machinist
when he is required to handle unusual and difficult material or to com-
pensate for extra fatigue that may be the result of having to work at a
forced pace on a special job. Thus, although it may be important as far
as the particular task is concerned, it occurs too infrequently to be im-
portant in the overall picture of time standards.
In the computation of standard time, as in the case of base time,
there is much suspicion of the validity of the results obtained froLu the
utilization of subjective procedures. Hut, since labor acknowledges that
time study is the best method of measurement that exists at present, it has
worked out a pragmatic solution to this apparent dilemna—acceptance of the
standards with reservations. The provisions that apply to tentative accept-
fjnce of standards based on levelled time apply equally to the acceptance of
the definitive time standard for an operation whether levelling is employed
or not.
That a case for the total rejection of time study could be pre-
pared is undeniable, but it is equally true that time study is the most ac-
curate technique available for measuring a reasonable day's work. (2)
1. Gomberg, "The Relationship Between the Unions and Engineers," p. 427*
2. Spencer ;'iller,Jr., "Labor's Attitude Toward Time and i.'otion Studyi'
Mechanical Sngin^ec
, LX, ad^ (1958)j ^. g
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Acknowledging this and recognising the necessity for such a measurement,
labor is in the position of having to present a superior system at the
same time it rejects the presert one to avoid the charge of irresponsi-
bility. (1) It should not be inferred that this is the unanimou'S opinion
of labor because sach obviously is not the case. There are some unions,
those in the building trades for example, who categorically reject time
study; however, much of labor does not concur in this opinion.
1. Gomberg, "The Relation-hip Between Jnions and Engineers,"?. 426.
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IV REASONS FOR LABOR'S RESISTA^'CE TO LATERAL DETERMINATION
The reasons put forth by labor to justify its participation in
the setting of time standards may be traced back to a single source, the
concern of labor for the welfare of the workers. (1) The individual rea-
sons that are advanced for the necessity of participation are all instru-
ments brought into play to achieve this puri^ose. It is for this reason
that the denial of this right is fought against by so many unions; exclu-
sion from participation is to them a barrier to the fulfilment of this aim.
Thus, management claims to the contrary, participation is a means to an end
not an end in itself.
Much of the necessity for participation arises out of the weak-
nesses of the methods by which standards are obtained. Despite manage-
ment's claims that they are the result of engineering techniques and as such
not within the realm of collective bargaining, labor feels that these tech-
niques have very definite limitations which remove their results from the
class of other engineering calculations. It maintains that the likelihood
of inaccuracies, which would result in grossly unjust standards, is great
enough to warrant their being removed from the exclusive jurisdiction of
management and brought within the sphere of mutual action. The range of
this mutual action varies from joint studies to the right to carry the dis-
puted standards throurh the grievance procedure. Labor is not at all in
agreement as to the most effective neasure. This, however, is unimportant
when viewed against the almost universal agreement that some action is ne-
1. William Gomberg, "The Union Looks at Management Engineering," Proceedings
of the National Time and Motion Study Clinic (Nov. 1 and 2, 1945).
1
ceasary.
"...Little recognition has been given to txie fact
that it is the worker's job and health. . . that will be
affected. For this reason, he should be protected in his
relations to change." (1)
Thus, it is more than the economic welfare of the worker that stimulates
libor to seek for the removal of standards from the realm of unilateral
control. Too much of every^living is enmeshed in this issue to make it
see32 advisable for labor to allow the determination of standards to remain
cor:.pletely outside of its influence.
"Labor's request is that included in the area of
study should be the individual worker's preference and anti-
pathies, the group's welfare and economy as part of the total
picture." (2)
i'urther, labor takes the position that these considerations should be given
as much weight as the qualities of efficiency and economy. Although at first
glance these two groups might appear to be mutually exclusive, such is not
truly the case. The results of recent studies in the psychology of indus-
try and fatigue have revealed that these considerations have a very definite
effect on the economy and efficiency of operations. It is impossible to state
any definite relationship because of the incompleteness of current knowledge
in these two fields, but that such does exist is becoming increasingly evi-
dent as study progresses. V/hat their effect is on efficiency and economy
is not the issue however, what does concern labor is the fact that the wor-
kers are not machines and, consequently, should not be treated as thougr ^
1. Spencer lAiller, Jr., "La or'a Attitude Toward Time and Ivlotion Study,"
l.Iechanical Engineer
, LX, (1958) p. ,290.
2. H. M. Hedges, "Time and Motion Under Collective Bargaining," Advanced
Management
, V, (1940) p. 90.
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they were, ''anagement
'
b tendency to overlook the personal aspects of work
has long been scored. In 1915> R* F. Hoxie, coLiinenting on scientific uianage
ment of which tiaie study is an integral part, took the position that manage-
ment's relations to labor v/ere unscientific because it failed to cor.sider
all elements of a job with the result that the worker was being dealt with
as if he were just another piece of mechanical eouipment. (1) That this
omission has been continued is evident froa labor's sustained protest agains
it.
To effect the inclusion of these generally neglected elements a
certain amount of reorientation o-' methods and practitioners of time study
is necessary; there must be an abateoient of managerial dictation in favor
of cooperative approach. This requires the development of engineering data
not only through contacts and conferences with other engineers and from
textbooks but also through the dynamic cooperation of the workers who are
being studied. It is not enough that the worker remain passive toward the
study, he must have an active part in it. Another prerequisite for the in-
clusion of these elements is the acceptance of the right of the worker to v
veto standards that endanger his health, standard of living, and other si-
milar values. (2)
Another aspect of time study methods that lends itself to the sup-
port of those who advocate labor participation is that in a large number of
cases no provision is mde for the worker to think about his job and methods
of improvement. Time study, as it is generally carried out, removes this
1. Robert Franklin Hoxie, Scientific I/ianagement and Labor (New York, 1915 )t
2. xHedges, "Time and Motion Under Collective Bargaining," p. 90.
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function from the worker and places it on the engineer and planning office.
The effect of this is to relegate the worker to the position of an automa-
ton with nothing but purely mechanical duties. This has been attacked both
by organized labor and socially minded people outside of the labor movea-xent
as socially unacundj they feel that it is essential for the v/orker to bring
his faculties to bear on the job in order that he may get mental stimula-
tion and satisfaction from his labors. (1)
In addition to the intrinsic weaknesses of the method by which
time standards are obtained, the execution of the time studies often
leaves much to be desired. Properly employed these studies are a combina-
tion of "techniques and procedures demanding a trained and skillful
personnel, careful and adequate preparation, and continuous
application with no other jiotive than efficient industrial
operation and fair compensation." (2)
Ideally these conditions are met, but practically there is considerable de-
viation from them. Many unions feel that time standards are used to ^et
maximum amount of effort from the workers at the smallest possible cost in
wages. Although this may be somewhat of an exaggeration, there is sufficient
validity in the statement to justify labor in its request for some degree
of jurisdiction over them. A further deviation that is frequently cited
by labor is the use of ti:ae study technicians and engineers who are familiar,
neither with the job nor the industry. It is felt that people wiih these
qualifications are not capable of arrivin^i; at an equitable standard because
of their lack of knowledge of the peculiarities of the manufacturing pro-
1. Miller, "Labor's Attitude Toward Time and Motion Study," p. 292.
2. Kennedy, Union Policy and Incentive Wage ^f^eAhods
, p. 40.
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cesses. (1) The workers contend that no one who is unfamiliar with a
particular job is capable of predicting the variations in the quality of
the raw material, the equipment, and other working conditions accurately
enough to weight the base ti-xe properly to compensate for these factors.
Until about I95O much was made of the fact that scientific manage-
ment was a reversion to industrial autocracy and that it intensified mana-
gerial dictation to the point where it infringed on the rights and ability
of the workers to present grievances. (2) Labor was excluded from so
much that vitally concerned it that it appeared to be a definite to unionism.
It left the union aa a practically functionless organization by virtue of
the fact that the system required al.uost absolute managerial control of all
of the worker's activities.
Since most of these managerial activities were centered about the
determination and administration of time standards, the objections to the
system and the necessity for participation may reasonably be transferred to
time standards, i-iuch of the potency of these o ejections has been lost due
to the power that has been acquired by the union and the fact that the right
to form unions and engage in collective bargaining is now protected by law.
Thus, with the status of unions assured these reasons lose much of their
former pertinency.
One aspect of labor participation that tends to be overlooked is
the fact that .here time studies have been most successful the methods and
objectives have been carefully explained in advance of any action the coopera-
tion of labor has been obtained. Although all the advajitage would seem to
1. Miller, "Labor's Attitude Toward Time and Motion Study," pp. 290, 558.
2. Hoxie, Scientific Management and Labor
, p. I7.

accrue to management, labor has much to gain from standards that are suc-
cessfully and amicably set. If time standards are obtained that are satis-
factory to both parties without arousing ill feelings on either side, the
g(^d will generated brings dividends to both sides. The friendly settle-
ment of so im ortant an issue predisposes each side to adopt a reasonable
attitude in their day to day relationship which is the primary desire of
both parties.
Although the necessity for participation is generally agreed upon
by labor, there is little agreement as to the extent to which it is to be
engaged in or the means to be employed in this participation. Using the
extreme cases for the sake of illustration there are two alternatives, com-
plete active Participation in which the union is the co-author of the stan-
dards and underwrites their correctness and absolutely passive participation
in which the union passes on the acceptability of standards that are determined
by management alone and applies for rectification of unacceptable standards
through the regular grievance procedure. Between these extremes lie the
great majority of the solutions to the problems of how and how much.
So much of their effort has been directed toward the settlement
of grievances from too exacting standards that the unions are constantly
searching for an equitable method of getting mutually satisfactory standards
with a minimum of friction. The solution that a few unions have adopted
recently is joint determination on an equal basis with management. (1)
Although very few unions have made use of this plan, it has much to recom-
mend it from a practical standpoint, since sooner or later labor is going
l."Some Problems in Wage Incentive Administration,' Studies in Personnel
Policy §19, National Industrial Conference Board, (1940) p. 16.

to have to abandon its present policy of always demanding cnore and dis-
cuss standards with management on some logical and concrete basis. (1)
Paralleling management's efforts from the outset serves not only to bring
the discussions onto common ground and hence enhance the chances of reach-
ing agreement but also to save a tremendous duplication of work.
Essential to the proper functioning of this plan is the adequate
training of the union time study stewards on whom the actual task of time
study falls. The usual course given for union representatives by manage-
ment or management-oriented schools amounts to hardly more than a course
in the clerical techniques of time study with no examination of the assump-
tions on which these clerical operations are based. (2) The almost in-
evitable result is that the union stewards, because they are obliged to ac-
cept the management's techniques uncritically, corroborate the standards
that their technicians have obtained. Thus these stewards have become lit-
tle more than company representatives in the union, often to the point where
they sponsor questionable practices. (5) Obviously, this situation is a
bar to a coequal determination of standards.
Tc^nsure that this situation does not arise, the unions should
conduct their own training courses in which a critical examination of the
underlying assumptions on which time study is based as well as an exposi-
tion of techniques should be included. (4) The resultant broader under-
standing will immeasurably strengthen the steward's ability to make con-
1. Gomberg, "Union Interest in Engineering Techniques," p. 564.
2. "Economic Fundamentals of Colective Bargaining," Personnel SerieSyflO^
American Management Association, (1946) p. 56.
5. Gomberg, "Union Interest in Engineering Techniques," p. ^64.
4. Ibid., p. 564.

structive criticisms and uphold the union's interests. Further, by enabling
them to make inde p endent studies using their own techniques, it is possible
for the stewards to establish criteria by which they may measure management's
standards, "ithout this knowledge all that can really be judged is the me-
chanical and arithmetical accuracy that was achieved.
The tremendous prejudice that exists among the rank and file of
workers against time standards and the suspicion with which they look on
all management engineering techniques makes soiiie for>.i of union security pro-
vision— closed shop, union shop, maintenance of membership clause, or some
other—essential for the success of this type of participation. Few unions
could get this plan adopted initially, and even these few would probably
be obliged to abrogate this section of the agreement or face destruction by
the withdrawal of dissident members unless it were afforded some measure
of security while the workers adjusted to the new role which the union was
playing. (1) Furthermore, if union membership is not a condition of em-
ployment it is highly probable that the existence of the union would be
constantly threatened by workers who had become disaffected by being told
that their complaints about standards were unjustified.
In addition to this very real danger that threatens any union
that assumes the responsibilities incumbent on joint participation, there
are other difficulties in full union participation. One of the greatest is
the lack of resources of the average union which prevents it from matching
industry in the highly specialized personnel required. They have neither
the time nor the money necessary for adequate time and motion studies.
1. Ibid., p. 564.

Moreover, even if they did have such resources there are very few manage-
ments who would recognize the average union representative as qualified
to criticize their work. (1)
Without even considering the operating difficulties of such a plan,
some leaders reject it on principle alone. They feel that it is not within
the province of a labor union to cooperate on that level. It appears to
them that adequate protection is afforded labor if it has the right to ques-
tion, investigate, or negotiate any standards that appear to be oppressive;
closer cooperation than this seems to exceed the functions of the union. (2)
Denial of the objective character of time studies and rejection of
Partnership in standard determination does not mean that the union cannot
make good use of men qualified by training and experience to meet manage-
ment engineers on their term . In certain industries, those that are tra-
ditionally on a piece work basis, the subject of standards must inevitably
arise in one form or another; it is here that such men are invaluable. A
few of these unions, notably those in the clothing industry, maintain a head-
quarters staff of men who qualify as engineers in their industry to aid the
locals in this phase of their contract negotiations. These men are primarily
trouble shooters who are only sent out when the situation demands it. (5)
The availaiility of this staff permits the locals to avoid joint determination
and still derive many of the benefits that would result from it.
The vast majority of unions that eschew direct participation in
standard determinations resort instead to the regular collective bargaining
1. Kennedy, Union Policy and Incentive V<'age Methods
, p. 150.
2. Ibid., p. 151.
5. Ibid., p. 157.

for their protection froin inequalities. The devices used in this frame-
work are extremely diverse. Sosie are corajletely ^Jassive in nature providing
for nothing more than appeal through regular grievance channels for the ad-
justment of standards that appear to be uns itable. Others, considering
that such a specialized subject requires separate and specific treatiuent,
develop detailed plans specially adapted for the purpose. Between these
passive measures and the extreciely active ones described above there are
many gradations. These manifest themselves in the various detailed clauses
applying to time studies that are inserted in the union contracts.
Those v,'ho are not reconciled to joint participation in standard
determinations and yet wish to take an active part in their establishment
accomplish this by such means as having a steward present during the study,
or reviewing the data and computations before the rate is installed. Some-
times unions of this persuasion, instead of having the department stewards
involved in this issue, will have all proposed studies and results explained
to the chief steward who discusses them with the engineers before they are
put into effect. (1
)
Probably the inost common method of supplementing the general col-
lective bargaining control of standards is the introduction of clauses which
regulate the time, manner, or conditions under which the studies are made.
These clauses specify such things as the operator to be studied, allowances
that must be made, operating conditions that must be maintained, in fact
they may cover any phase of standards that is considered essential to the
development of fair tasks. (2) In addition to this application, these
1. Ibid., p. 207.
2. Chapter V, this study.
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same clauses may be found in conjunction with some type of supervisory
clause.
In some of the industries in which standards are customarily set-
tled through the regular collective bargaining processes, arbitration has
became an important means of determining these standards. The I.lassachusetts
boot and shoe industry has taken its piece rate disputes to the State Board
of Conciliation and Arbitration for settlement many times. This board en-
gages experts to study the problem at first hand and make recommendations
which are then used as the basis for the Hoard's decision. The clothing
industry, in those centers where arbitration is accepted, uses a slightly
different procedure. Instead of using a state agency as arbitrator an Im-
partial Chairman's office is used to perform the same function. The same
device, an impartial board selected by both labor and management in the in-
dustry, is utilized by the full fashioned hosiery industry. Although other
industries occasionally arbitrate their differences, it is only in thase
Industrie'^ that it is an integral part of the solution of the standards
problem; however, there is a continuous effort being made on that i-^ortion
of labor to whom arI)itration is unavailable for its acceptance.
To labor this acceptance of arbitration as the final step in bar-
gaining means that disagreements will be settled on the basis of merit rather
than on economic strength. It gives them the assurance that deadlocks will
finally be resolved by a competent impartial judge aftsr careful examination
of the facts rather than by any form of force. Although the decisinns may
not alv/ays be in its favor, at least it will have the assurance that manage-
ment's claims have been justified by the facts and not convenient fictions.
In some respects this approach to standards affords the same pro-
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tection as active participation. Tlvis is especially true when the arbi-
trator conducts his own independent investigation, since in this case a
second Party parallels management's work and checks it step by step. Even
when no independent study is rcade, the standards are subject to modifica-
tion by someone other than jcanagement. Thus many of the major benefits
to be derived from direct participation may be garnered from this procedure
as well.
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V FROT-ECTIVE i.lEASURES TAKEN BY LABOR
As indicated by the preceding znaterial, there are many approaches
to the subject of f-roduction standards. The clauses that follov; are a rep-
resentative group gleaned from actual contracts and illustrate specific ac-
tions that have been taken by various unions on the subject of time standards.
They represent a compromise between labor's desire to reject tiriie study on
the basis of its fallibility and its recognition of the fact that it is the
best method extant for the determination of a fair day's work. The reluc-
tance to accept any time standard as final is clearly showii by provisions
for trial periods, procedures for altering them, and observation of the studies
as they are being made. It is through these mechanisms that labor reconciles
its acceptance of time standards with its knowledge of the weaknesses in
the method used in arriving at them.
The first example, while not adhering to the principles mentioned
above, is by no means a rarity. Many unions still resist the use of time
standards and wherever possible prohibit their introduction. Such is the
case with the Hetal Trades Department of the A. F. of L. in their contract
with the . . .Shipbuilders on April 25> 19^1 which simply states that,
"There shall be no contract, bonus, piece or task
work, nor shall there be a limit on, or curtailment of, pro-
duction. . . " (1)
Quite the opposite approach is used by the Coleman Employees Federation,
an independent union, which accepts both time study and bonuses. They,
however, retain the ultimate control over the standard by stipulating what
1. "Collective Bargaining Develooments and Representative Union Agreements,"
p. 27.
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the relationship shsill be between the time required by the average worker
and the standard. These are provided for in the following extracts from
Article XIII, Section 1 of their contract with the Coletaan Lamp and Stove
Company.
"The Company agrees it shall establish and . . . en-
deavor to maintain all production base rates at a point which
will enable the average • . . worker to earn on the average a
twenty per cent bonus without undue or injurious physical ef-
fect.
"The Federation agrees that all production workers
shall cooperate fully with the time study men in order to . . .
determine the necessary time required to properly perform each
production operation.
"Time and motion studies. . . may be taken when and
as often as may be deemed necessary by the Company. (1)
The union, in order to protect itself from having the standards
cut after they are established satisfactorily, included in this section a
very common provision which states the circumstances under which the stati-
dard may be changed.
"It is further agreed that after an operation has
been fairly stabilized as to method and has been time studied
a second time the production base rate shall not be changed
except:
1. ... an obvious clerical error.-. .
2. A change in condition or method has occurred since
the job was last studied and base rate determined
that may reasonably be thought to have affected the
job.
5. A request for restudy is made by a workman, as here-
inafter provided. (2)
The Rubber Workers Union Federal local # 21914 (a. F. of L.),
while making no specific provisions for the possibility of grievances aris-
ing from standards, did include in their contract of January 194^ with the
liood Rubber Company both the right to observe the time study as it is being
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.

made and the right to inspect all data ar.d commutations used in the deter-
mination of standards. By making no special provision for the settlstnent
of disputes arising over standards the union does not deny itself the right
to carry its disputes through the grievance procedure, it merely indicates
that it does not wish to set up special procedures or restrict itself as
to how or when they may be taken care of. Many unions have adopted this
course of including the settlement of such disagreements in their general
grievance clause.
Less reservation in the acceptance of time study methods and
principles is indicated by this clause than any other that will be mentioned;
the only req drement that it makes is that future studies shall be made in
conformance with present practices. To insure this, the right to examine
or observe the taking of the data is provided for.
The specific material pertaining to time studies is contained in
Article III of the contract.
"Section 5* (a) All labor time standards shall be
established in conformity to present time
study practices of the Company. These prac-
tices require that fair consideration shall
be given to the requisite quality of work-
manship and reasonable working capacities of
normal employees.
(b) Labor time standi rds . . . available In
the depart L^ent ... in which the operation
. . . performed.
(c) Any steward . . . shall upm request to
his foreman be present at and observe any
operation being time studied for standards
. . . The Standard Department Supervisor
shall, at the request of the steward, review
with him the data and computations on which
any standard is based . . I' (1)
1. Ibid., p. 11.
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The United Auto, Aircraft, and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America in its contract with General i.lotors in 194' adopted a di^'ferent ap-
proach to the problem of protecting its members from unjust standards. Rath-
er than trying to specify the level at which it may be set, the union reserves
for itself the right to challenge any standard that appears to be unfair.
For this purpose it sets up an elaborate grievance procedure dealing exclu-
sively with the adjustment of standards. 3y accepting the general principles
of time standards and not setting any positive requirements the union is in
a position where it may challenge any standard, regardless of its theoreti-
cal correctness, without being open to charges of unreasonableness. Among
unions that feel that any participation in rate setting decreases their abi-
lity to protect their members this is a favored type of clause. (1)
Acceptance of time study as the means to be used in determining
job loads is expressed in such general terms that they are committed to up-
hold no standard.
(78) "Production standards shall be established on
the basis of fairness and equity consistent with quality and
workmanship, efficiency of operations, and reasonable work-
ing capacities of normal operators. The local management of
each plant has full authority to settle suoh matters."
The details of each step as well as the order in which they are
to be invoked are carefully set down in the clause.
(79) "\'Ihen a dispute arises regarding standards es-
tablished or changed by the management, the complaint should
be taken up with the foreman. If the dispute is not settled
by the foreman, the cominitteeman for that district,. . . ,
examine the job and the foreman or time study man will fur-
nish him with all the facts in the case. If there is still
1. S. T. Williams and Herbert Harris, Trends in Collective --argaining (New
York, 1945), p. 4.
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a dispute after the committeeriian has completed his re-exaiLina-
tion, the foreman or time study man will then re-exaiuine the
operations in detail with the committeemaji on the job. If the
matter is not adjusted at this stage, it may be further ap-
pealed as provided in the grievance procedure. (1)
A similar negative approach to time standards is evident in the
December 2, 1942 contract of the United Steel Workers of America with Jones
and Laughlin Steel Corporation. Here too, the entire section devoted to
time standards is concerned vdth settling disputes rather than specifica-
tions to be met in obtaining them. The role or challenger is reserved for
the union in both contracts; it is only in the procedure that differences
occur.
The first of these procedural modifications is the provision for
a trial period for the standard before either the union or the company can
invoke the grievance procedure to modify it. This is a logical concoinitant
of the general attitude of passive acceptajice of standards since it makes
the acceptance of each standard dependent only on the results of its ap-
plication. By requiring each standard to stand on its own merits the union
ia unhampered by the necessity for finding the specific flaw in a standard
that makes it unacceptable. A course that it would be obliged to follow
in order to maintain its good i"aith if a particular method of obtaining the
standard viere specified.
The establishment of an impartial umpire as the ultimate authority
in the settlement of disputes over standards is the second of the procedural
variations. Since his sole concern is a prompt and unbiased solution, rea-
son rather than economic interest may be assumed as the basis of his decisinn.
1. "Collective Bargaining Developments and Representative Union Agreements,"
p. 50.
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Use of a trial period is especially appropriate when an umpire is provided
because it tends to keep the discussion lefore him on a factual basis.
These various features pertaining to standards are contained in
Section 11 of the contract.
1. "When a bona fide new job or position is established
—
(a) Manage::ient will develop an appropriate rate by
regular procedures in effect in the Corporation for
its industrial engineering and industrial relations
activities ...
(b) Such procedures having been conformed to, the
rates may be established by Ilanagesient to cover
the job or position in question. The Union Griev-
ance Coamitteeman or Cornmitteemen . . . and em-
ployees to be affected shall be informed by Manage-
ment in advance concerning such rates.. . . The rate
having been established may subsequently be subject
to adjustment as provided . . .
(c) If after reasonable trial period . . griev-
ances are all-eged by either employees or I.'.anagement
concerning sj.ch rates—which grievances cannot be
satisfactorily adjusted by mutual agreement—the
question as to the equity of such rates in relation
to the plant rate structure and the requirements of
the job. . . as established by sound industrial en-
gineering procedures . . . may be appealed to an im-
partial umpire. . . , but no formal grievance may be
presented . . . until a reasonable period . . .
since the installation of the rates and operation of
new equipment, which period will permit of study and
adjustment, if necessary, of the r^tes to the varying
conditions of operation. . . (1)
The Textile Worker's Union of America in its contract of June 19,
1945 with the New Bedford Cotton Manufacturer's Association, used ^very.
.
similar tactics in protecting its members from unfair time standards. Ex-
cept for the omission of a special provision for an impartial umpire as the
arbiter of disputes arising over standards, the two clauses are parallel.
1. Ibid., pp. 59, 60.
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Article VI. Wages
* * *
C 7 (b) "Tentative Fixing of Piece Rates for New Types or
Methods of Work—Where new types of work are introduced into
a particular mill . . . , the employer may set up temporary
piece rates. Piece rates so fixed shall not become estab-
lished until the expiration of a period not more than four
(4) weeks froff the time the product or construction was first
put into the process of manufacture in the jobs affected.
Article VII. Work Assignments
* + *
5. "Changes in Work Assignments — The employer shall have the
right to install new work assignments or to change existing
work assignments. Whenever the employer desires to install
new work assignments he shall give notice to, and hold avail-
able for, the Union a report descriptive of the work assign-
ments. At the completion of a survey embracing operating and
time studies . . , all data concerning the work loads, piece
work rates, and abse rates shall be entered on a form pre-
pared for this purpose . . . Every effort should be made to
reconcile differences before installation of a new or changed
work assignment.
C Trial Periods
* * *
"Any grievances concerning a work assignment set as the re-
sult of a trial period shall be made within fifteen (15)
days following conclusion of the trial period or shall be
considered abandoned." (1)
These clauses, by no means an exhaustive collection, serve to il-
lustrate the wide range of possibilities that is available to the union in
writing a time standard clause. Depending on the attitude of the union and
the strength of its bargaining position time stady may be rejected, whole-
1. Ibid., pp. 64-65.

heartedly accepted, or accepted with limitations and restrictions. Since
it is a part of the collective bargaining agreement, the clause is usually
a compro'jise between the union's desire to reject or control the standards
and management's desire to exercise complete freedom of action.
Although the various protective clauses directly applying to time
standards can be written down, there is one problem intimately connected
with standards that is practically impossible to reduce to contractual terms.
When is a job sufficiently changed to warrant a new study and a new stan-
dard? This problem is aggravated considerably by the fact that retiming
is one device used by management for the purpose of reducing standards.
The device commonly adopted to justify this retiming is to change the job
in some minor respect so that there is an apparent excuse although from a
practical standpoint it may be negligible. Once this justification for
retiming is established, by a manipulation of the computations the stan-
dards can be changed to suit the needs or desires of the management. All
labor is suspicious of retiming because of these circumstances and bitter-
ly resists any retiming unless the job is changed to a very considerable
extent. For this reason it is very common to include in the agreement a
clause to the e-f^fect that no change in standards will be attempted unless
there is a distinct change in the method or equipment of the job. This
type of clause, although it may bring the issue into the open, does lit-
tle to solve the actual problem because of the extreme difficulty of de-
fining exactly what constitutes a real change. Labor has all too many in-
stances of changes that were made solely for the purpose of evading the
clause and getting new lower standards. (1)
1. Kennedy, Union Policy and Tncentivvq 'A'age Methods, jp. 212-215.
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The problem is one of distinguishing between a revision of an
old standard and the setting of a new one. (1) Vo one denies that there
is often justification of setting these, it is inevitable in a competitive
economy that new and more efficient methods will be developed, many based
on previous methods, i.^ost of labor agrees that nevi standards are justifi-
able in these cases, their grievance is with the restudies that are made
on jobs purely for the sake of lower standards, justified by a veneer of
change that is not real. (2)
Because of the impossibility of satisfactorily defining a change
much time is spent by management and labor in clearing up individual cases.
Labor's extreme sensitivity and tenacity on this point is quite understand-
able when one considers that any change in the standard has an immediate
effect on the earnings of the workers. (5)
A common type of clause that affords general protection is one
that specifies that new standards will be set into effect only after they
have been agreed on by both parties, these are just measures to assure that
all standards are within the area of collective bargaining. What is actual-
ly accomplished in the ensuing discussions is dependent on how strongly the
union feels about the standard at issue and the confidence that each party
has in the good faith of the other. (4)
By far the most common type of safeguard utilized by labor is the
non-specific clause which provides for carrying disputes over standards
1. Ibid., P. 212.
2. Ibid., p. 212.
5. Ibid., p. 211.
4. Ibid., p. 202.

through the regular grievance procedure for aettleaent. Even in those
cases where the union has a representative in the time study department or
where it has included in the contract the right to observe and review all
time studies, the usual procedure is to resolve differences of opinion that
may arise through the regular procedure. (1) Often, however, there are
supi-lementary prohibitions and requirements that are imposed by labor for
additonal protection. These are usually aimed at regulating the circum-
stances surrounding the study—time, manner, or conditons under which it is
made. (2)
When the timing is to be done, both in the case of the original
study and the restudy of an operation, is of extreme importance to both la-
boi' and management. If the initial timing is done before the operation is
running smoothly, the rate will be too high; on the other hand, if it is
delayed too long the worker is deprived of the benefits of his increased
efficiency by an unduly tight standard. For this reason the type of clauses
that follow are often inserted in the contract.
"Piece rates shall be established not later than ^0 days
after the start of production on any new job, such rates
shall be subject to review and negotiation by the union
not later than 60 days after the start of the job." ( ^AW -
Studebaker) (5)
A similar clause which states the situation even more clearly:
'It is understood that operations will be time studied as
soon as they are runring efficiently . . . the company
will be allowed 4 working days tt^et an operation run-
ning efficiently, except on major changes done on lines.
1. Ibid., p. 189.
2. Ibid., p. 241.
5. Ibid., ;.. 245.
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when they will be allowed a total of 10 working days."
(HAW - Willys-Overland) (1)
In the case of retiming, in order to prevent the worker from being kept on
hie low rate by the management's stalling, they specify a definite time with-
in which the restudy is to be made after the request has been received.
Conditions to be maintained or avoided and factors that must be
considered are often included among these supplementary clauses, frequently
as the result of previous disagreements with management regarding a particu-
lar point. One of the most detailed clauses concerned with both of these
considerations is contained in the agreement of August 1959 between the
United Auto Workers (C. I. 0.) and the v;illys-Overland iJotors, Incorporated!
"In timing all jobs, the time allowed for performing an
operation shall be the time necessary for the regular
operator familiar with the operation. The tools, equip-
ment, the material provided and the quality of the fin-
ished part up to the standard required by the inspection
department, withiout causing excess scrap, or undue daaage,
wear of tools and equipment, with operator working at a
pace he can maintain day after day without injury to him-
self or his fellow employees; with such tiuie allowed to
replenish the supplies, oil, and clean the equipment, and
all the details that are necessary and which are expected
to occur in the ordinary day's work. Those are classed as
contingencies and a percentage shall be added to the time
allflwed to take care of them. In addition, 10% of the time
allowed for actually performing the operation shall be ad-
ded for personal contingencies. (2)
A less detailed but more coriimon type of clause is that found in the United
Rubber V/orkers - Continental Rubber Works contract of September, 19^1 which
covers just one aspect of the study:
"When practical, time studies vn-ll be made on experienced
operators who regularly perform the work . . . Time studies
on such operators will be used in determining their aver-
age. The same applies to rechecks. When one operator is
1. Ibid., p. 244.
2. Ibid., p. 247.
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time studied more than once, all studies will be used
in determining the average output for the operator." (1)
To insure that specific allowances are applied to the base time,
some unions specify in the contract the values that are to be used for such
factors as fatigue, personal time, and set up time. Among the unions that
adopt this course there is a wide variation in application, even among lo-
cals in the same international union. Some stipulate exact amounts while
others just indicate that some allowance should be made; some enumerate all
the allowances while others just those that they consider essential; there
are even variations in the value assigned to a particular allowemce in dif-
ferent plants organized by the same union. (2)
Although this type of clause is undeniably effective and used by
some unions, the non-specific clauses have, on the whole, gained greater
currency and afforded more protection to labor.
"Considering manufacturing industry as a whole, unions
probably accomplish more for their members in the way of checking
abuse and correcting maladjustments through ordinary collective
bargaining than through more direct forms of participation and
control." (5)
1. Ibid., p. 245.
2. Ibid., p. 24?.
5. Ibid., p. I87.
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VI THE CLEVELAND GARJ;!ElNrT INDUSTRY -
THE EPITOME OF COOPERATION
To understand better the high degree of cooperation that was
achieved in the case that will be cited, it is necessary to recognize some
of the background factors which helped bring it about. The initial whole-
hearted cooperation and equal participation are set against a background
of bad economic conditions. The Cleveland garment industry episode oc-
curred during: the recession of the early 1920 's during which the union was
faced with the fact that its presence caused a labor cost differential
which put the employers in a bad competitive position thereby endangering
the livelihood of the union members by liniting their employment opportu-
nities. Thus the alternative to cooperation in finding a way to remove
this competitive handicap was destruction of the local union and the em-
ployer's business, an occurrence wliich was not at all uncommon where either
one or both of the parties remained adamant and refused to make concessions.
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The Cleveland Women's Garment Industry (1
)
V/ith the onset of the depression which followed the boom conditions
of World '.Var I the unions found themselves faced with hostile managements
just waiting for an opportunity to destroy them. One of the prime reasons
for this desire was the fact that despite the big slump that had occurred
in prices the unions were insisting that no wage reductions should be made.
Their success in maintaining this policy put the employers in a very pre-
carious competitive condition because the non-union establishments were
able to make large cuts and thus maintain their profit margins more or less
intact in the face of the large price drops that had occurred. This being
the situation, it was felt by many unions that it was incumbent upon them
to try to establish better relations between theci and the employers through
the reduction of the cost differential by cooperation in the elimination of
waste and the increase of production.
Until the end of 1919 the international union in the garment in-
dustry had been attempting to substitute timework for piecework as a basis
for wage payment. In 1919 there had been strikes in .iiost of the principal
producing centers to gain this end; a strike had been averted in Cleveland
by arbitration which gave the workers an increase in wages but did not abol-
ish piecework. During the life of this contract, a period of six months,
a marked change took place in the relations betwsen the employers and the
unions. The employers decided to abandon their attitude of antagonism to-
ward the unions and accept collective bargaining; the unions reconciled
themselves to the principle of scientific management. (2)
1. Slichter, Union Policies and Industrial Management
,
Chap. 14.
The historical facts are Slichter' s.
2. Louis Levine, The Women's Garment 'Vorkers (New York, 1924), pp. J^O-^yO.
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At the end of this period a new contract was negotiated which provided
for a system of production standards instead of the union's timework or
the employer's piecework. To determine these time standards, the use of
elemental time data was decided on as the only practical method. This me-
thod entailed the collection and recording of the time for the individual
elements in the various operations and keeping the fixed and variable
elements separate. Times were determined for these variable elements un-
der the various conditions that caused the variance such as the length of
the seam, the type of material being worked, the various styles, etc. so
that elemental times were available for the majority of elements under most
conditions. Since it was not possible to get times on all the elements that
might occur, when an element appeared in an operation on which there was no
time, the operation was completely time studied to get this time. The me-
thod used in obtaining the fixed times was exactly the same, however the
problem was much simpler since there were majiy fewer possibilities and by
definition these were unchanging. After collecting and recording these
times, it was a relatively simple matter to determine the time standard
for an operation—a matter of breaking the operation in question into its
elements, looking up the times for these elements, totalling them, and ap-
plying the various allowances decided upon. This was a compromise between
the two antithetical systems proposed originally and was indicative of the
change in attitude which had taken place d^^ring the previous six months.
It seemed to promise the reconciliation of the conflicting interests of
the employers and employees and a remedy for the arbitrariness of wage bar-
gaining.
1. Ibid.,
.p. 570.
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The employer's acceptance of this system can be understood if it
is considered in terms of what their alternative was, timework, a system
which they were very anxious to avoid. Labor's acceptance may be attri-
buted to their realization that reduction of the cost differential was es-
sential if the Cleveland area was to compete with other producin?^ areas
that v;ere less unionized and hence able to get cheaper labor, in addition
to this was the realization that the timework basis in the large factories
would cause much of the work to be subcontracted to the eoiiill shops over
which the unions had much more tenuous control. The standards of produc-
tion were accepted as a compromise which avoided the evils of piecework
and yet did not present the employers with the burden of timework.
The system of time standards as adopted by the manufacturer's
association and the union on June 25> 1920 was one in which the various
jobs we'-e assigned a standard time determined by time study and the workers
were paid at their regular hourly rates for the time represented by the num-
ber of jobs they did and a guarantee of 90^ of base wage was made for time
spent waiting for materials. The standards were to be set and administered
by a Bureau of Standards maintained jointly by the union and manufacturers
and responsible to the Board of Referees.
To put this system into operation an organization was constructed
for installing and operating the standards consisting of at least one time
study man -^or each plant, a joint approval committee for each plant, a Bu-
reau of Standards, and a supervisory committee on standards. The time
study men were made responsible for gathering data and constructing ten-
tative standards; these time study men were theoretically impartial men
hired and supervised by the Bureau of Standards, although actually they
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were employees of the liianufacturer subject to disiiiiasal by him. The ten-
tative standards were submitted to a plant approval board, made up of rep-
resentatives of the workers in the plant and the manufactureres , at appro-
val jieetings v?here each side v/as given the opportunity to accept or reject
all standards. Deadlocks occurring during these meetings between the time
study men and the couiudttea Wr^re submitted tc the Bureau of Standards.
This Bureau of Standards was responsible for all the technical work in the
installation and operation of the standards. V/ithin this general frame-
work of resp )n3ibility were '.he functions of selecting and training the
time study men, planning for the collection of data, standardizing time
study procedures, deciding on questions of a technical nature, assuring
that standards were equitable in practice, deciding disputes about stan-
dards, and handling complaints about the work of time study men. Any deci-
sions of this board might be overruled by an agreement between the manufac-
turers and the union, or by the 3:3SEd of Referees, the supreme appeal board
in the market. The character of this bureau changed several times during
the life of this cooperative venture. Initially it consisted of a super-
vising engineer, but the union, dissatisfied with having just one theore-
tically impartial expert, requested and was granted a change whereby two
engineers, one representing the union interests and the other those of
the manufacturers, composed the Bureau. This arrangement worked out very
poorly because of the inability of the engineers to agree. Consequently
it was necessary to change again, this time the services of experts were
dispensed with and the Bureau, whose name had been changed to the Joint
Pureau of Standards when it was changed to a bipartisan group, consisted
of manager of the manufacturers association and the manager of the union.
i
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The supervisory committee on standards made up of five men from the union,
five men from the employers, and the engineers in charge of the installa-
tion of the standards was the policy determining body and governed in a
general way the activities of the Bureau of Standards and the time study
men. This coinmittee was only active for a short time during the organiza-
tional period, after that the Bureau was able bo take care of all questions
that might have been referred to this committee.
In order to be able to set standards based on tiuie study there
were several points on which it was essential for the union and the majiu-
facturers to come to an agreement. The first point was the speed at which
work was to be done; this was decided to be based on the average output of
the average worker working under pre-standard conditions. Second was the
question of the proper method of work to be used as the basis for the deter-
mination of the time standard; it was decided that the method was to be an
average one that was in use in the shop, the union's position on this point
being that unless the manufacturers assured them that they were prepared to
teach the best method to all the woriers that basing the time on the best
method would be unfair; and in addition, using the best method would de-
prive the better workers of their traditional right to improve the method
and make more money. The next question that had to be solved was whether
the averages referred to should be shop or market averages. Mai-ket aver-
ages were decided in the case of the speed work because this procedure would
tend to put the different shops on a competitive basis and at the same time
deter the manufacturers from speeding up their workers so that they could
claim that the standards were set too loosely and should be revised. The
methods of work, on the other hand, were based on shop averages because of

-59-
the impracticability of using market averages.
"In general the selection of methods of setting standards
in the Cleveland garment industry was guided by three prin-
cipal considerations: (1) the desire to base standards up-
on the speed and methods of work that had been achieved un-
der bargaining; (2) the desire to equalize competitive con-
ditions among the several shops; and (5) the need for a me-
thod that was largely independent of style changes and that
could be quickly applied at the beginning of each season to
new lines. It was the last consideration which led to the
use of element times,. . . (1)
After the principles had been agreed upon by negotiation between
the employers and the union, the problem of introducing the standards into
the shops had to be faced. These problems were especially acute in those
shops where the rates had been bargained up so high during the war and the
years immediately following that the ihstitution of the standards resulted
in a wage reduction; opposition arose to the standards at many points. The
standards by not including time that had to be spent waiting for the garments
seemed too low to the workers in terms of money when they viewed from the
standpoint of their old rates which had included payment for delays in get-
ting the work. They disregarded the fact that in addition to the standard
they were guaranteed 90% of their base rate for any time they spent waiting
for work. Another cause for opposition was the fact that customary dif-
ferential between the prices on high and low priced garments was not main-
tained; under the old bargaining system the employers had given considerably
more for the higher priced garments so that they could get low rates on the
lower priced ones where small differences in cost gave theai large competi-
tive advantages. Further opposition was met because there was no difference
1. Slichter, Union Policies and Industrial Management
, p. 404.
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made for the size of the lot, although large lots, by reducing the amount
of time necessary for change-over, allowed a worker to produce faster.
This acted as penalty on the workers producing higher priced garments
that usually ca:ne in smaller lots than did the lower priced ones. Another
difficulty encountered in introducing the standards of production was the
unwillingness of the employers to ass .me the res^- onsibility of ensuring
that the machines were kept at a high rate of efficiency and that there
were no unnecessary delays caused by faulty cutting, parts liiissing from
bundles, inefficient :LOvement of material to the workers, etc.; f.is type
of difficulty made its appearance because neither the methods of manage-
ment nor the conditions of work were adapted to standards.
V/ith the inauguration of this system of production standards,
problems in various phases of Oi'eration arose. These problems were, for
the most part, manifestations of the workers' distrust and dissatisfaction
with the system of production standards; in some cases, however, they were
due to inherent weaknesses in the system as it was constituted. This dis-
satisfaction and suspiciai manifested itself quite strongly in the attitude
and actions of the workers in the approval meetings, wnich often degenerated
into a bargaining session rather than discussion of the correctness of the
standards from a technical standpoint as had been originally intended. To
a certain extent the failure of these meetings could be attributed to the
failure to educate the workers to think in terms of time rather than money
and the failure to give the methods wide enough publicity. As a direct
result of this lack of understanding of the method much unnecessary anta-
gonism was generated by arguments over the time values assigned to various
garments.

-61-
The question of control of the studies and of the time study
men was another problem which caused a good deal of dissatisfaction
among the workers. The various changes that were made in the Bureau of
Standards, as mentioned above, were indicative of this feeling. Further
evidence of this condition is shown by the dissatisfaction caused by the
system of paying the time study men—the workers found it difficult to
believe that men who were paid i,v the employers and dependent on them for
any promotion could remain impartial.
Still further discontent was engendered by the fact that pre-
vious to their six weeks training course for this job, the time study men
had had no connection with the garment industry. The workers felt that
greater familiarity with the industry was necessary before truly accurate
standards which gave proper weight to the many intangibles could be got-
ten.
A whole series of problems were created by the failure to deve-
lop indisputable and objective methods of procedure. Although it was
agreed to time the average worker, the concept of average was left so
vague that there was much disagreement on this score. Another omission
was that of standardized methods for treatment of the readings and appli-
cation of allowances. This laid the standards open to the criticism of
arbitrariness and further strengthened the workers' claim that no man un-
familiar with the industry could produce a fair standard, oy allowing
the time study men in the various shops to work independently with no at-
tempt at comparison of their methods of making studies, u'-^Tormity, one
of the fundamental reasons for the adoption of the system, was neglected.
A further blow was dealt to uniformity by inadequate maintenance of pro-
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duction records which prevented standardization of method and periodic re-
view of data for the purpose of correction. (1)
The workers' dissatisfaction vath the time standards created still
another problem by leading them to distrust the basic data from which the
standards were derived. This Probler. was aggravated by the fact that there
was no committee of workers in any of the shops that was capable of criti-
cizing the element times on a rational and constructive basis; thus, al-
though the distrust in soijie cases was justified, no constructive suggestion
or demands were possible because of the intangible nature of the reasons for
this distrust.
The greatest difficulties in applying the standards arose over
the building up of standards from the element times. The most important
of these was the detection of the many ways that the workers lost time in
the execution o" the various elements: that this could only be dor^e ..hrough
many observations was acknowledged, but because of the lack of time was
often neglected. In this respect handling time, a very important element,
was especially hard to standardize because of the amount of unaccountable
variation not only between workers but also for the same worker at different
times.
Another problem in the building up of standards was thq Inability
to allow for style changes; this difficult\' arose because of the difficulty
in defining precisely what constituted a style change. This definition was
necessary in order to distinguish between a minor change which would have
no appreciable effect on the time and style change which would require a
1. Levine, The Women's Garment Workers, pp. 57O-579.
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revision of the standard.
Although these difficulties were overcoaie and fair standards set,
at the end of the first season of operation the workers were firmly united
in their desire to be rid of ths standards. Close analysis disclosed that
tliey had no specific coinplaint about the standards, but rather that they
had failed to adjust to the post-war level of wages and resented having to
accept a reduction from the inflated war time level. This resentment
reached such proportions by the date for the renegotiation of the contract
that they instructed their delegates to sign no contract that provided for
a continuation of the standards.
The manufacturers also had their grievances against the system
—
they wished to be rid of the ''"'orty week employment guarantee and to return
to piecev/ork. Thus the negotiations soon became deadlocked with the major
issue retention oP production standard or return to the old system of bar-
gaining the . iece rates. This deadlock was final 'y broken on December 27*
1922, by a compromise in which ".oth the standards of production and the em-
ployment guarantee were preserved; the former, despite the opposition of
the rank and file, was retained by the union manager because of his belief
in the principle. In addition to several clauses desired by the manufac-
turers, the agreement contained two co;. cessions to the union. The most
important of these was the reconstitution of the Bureau of Standards so
that it contained two engineers, one employed by the union and the other
by the manufacturer a; v/ith this change the .Vureau became Imown as the Joint
Bureau of Standards. The second change was the the jurisdiction over the
time study men was handed over completely to the Joint Bureau.
The dual control of the Bureau, which the union considered to be
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its major victory, failed utterly to achieve its purpose—to increase the
workers' confidence in the standards and to improve the op3ration of the
standards. The only real effect this change of control had was the can-
cellation 0'' the Bureau as an effective organization, the result of the
inability of the two partisan engineers to agree on anything. I.luch of
this inability to agree could be attributed to the union engineer who, while
making admittedly valid criticisms of the basic data and adLdnistration of
the standards refused to go out into the shops and try to adjust disputes
maintaining that it was senseless until these faults wer:.- corrected; this
attitude although logically defensible, was impractical because the adjust-
ment of disputes offered an excellent starting point for finding faults
and initiating corrective measures. A further obstacle to the functioning
of the Joint Bureau was the insistence of both engineers on accurate stan-
dards which served to prevent the few discussions that did take place from
accomplishing anything.
This destruction of the Board's ability to supervise the produc-
tion standards directly responsible •''or the eventual abandonment of this
unique experiment. This is quite fully borne out by various investigations
that were made of the plan. 3oth the union and l.lr* Francis Goodell fojnd
in their siXtdies of the system th^.t there was a lack of uniformity in pro-
cedure and adaiinistration of the standards and a few weaknesses in the basic
data. nOth of these complaints could have been remedied if there had been
some central impartial supervisory agency with jurisdiction over the time
study men. This was rendered impossible by the transformation of the Bureau
into a distinctly partisan organization with each of the members engrossed
in the Protection of his employer's interests.
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The second change, the transfer of the time study man's responsi-
bility for the employer to the Bureau, was equally futile. This was to
have been achieved by having the Bureau take complete jurisdiction over the
men, including the responsibility for paying them. In theory, tr.is might
have been successful, but practically it had no effect because the time
study man merely took a check from his em; 1 oyer ajid exchanged it for one of
a similar amount from the Bureau. Thus for all practical purposes the situa-
tion was unchanged because it was obvious to everyone that any increase in
pay would have to come from the employer.
Although the joint action ?/as not discontinued completely until
1951 > the abolition o^^ the Joint Board in the 1924 contract marked the real
end. From that time on, it became increasingly customary to bargain for the
piece rates rather than rely on ;.roduction standards.
While the plan failed to harmonize the divergent interests of the
employees and employers, it cannot be said that it was a complete failure
because it brought to the fore the possibility of the use of objective mea-
surement as a remedy for the arbitrariness of v/age bargaining. Furthermore
it firmly established the principle of collective bargaining and refined
the method by which it was carried on with respect to wage negotiations.
Fot the least benefit derived from this pioneering effort was the light that
it threw on the whole problem of production standards. (1)
1. Ibid., pp. 570-571.
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VII CAS:' HISTORIES OF P^RSSENT DAY PRACTICES
The Textile V-orkers Union of America (CLO.)
Faced with the increasing use of time study for setting rates,
standards, and work assignments, the Textile Workers Union of America re-
luctantly accepts the fact that it must reconcile itself to its employ-
aent. This grudging acceptance arises fron; the union's conviction that
the techniques are so crude that reliable results are extreraely unlikely.
From the standpoint of procedure alone, it contends that, in addition to
the stop watch being inadequate and the observer being incapable of seeing
enough, elapsed time is no guage of the physical and mental cost of work.
Its distrust of present day procedure is further heightened by the unsound
statistical methods used in selecting representative time values for each
element and in converting the elapsed time to standard time.
To this indictment on procedural grounds, the union adds its con-
demnation of the manner in which the techniques are applied in the textile
industry. On this score, its fundamental complaint is that the industry
ignores the special subtle Problems that accompany the application of time
study to machine tending jobs, the characteristic ones in the industry.
These arise as the result of multiple assignments, work duties and schedules
being set by management and machines rather than the worker, the 'fact that
the machines are serviced by a crew rather than by an individual, and the
variations in quality standards set by management in vague terms and fre-
quently not relayed to the workers. (1) The auto^iatic preclusion of solu-
1. IVhy the ".'orkload Froblea in the Textile Industry
, pp. '^-11
»

-67-
tions resulting from the neglect of these problems causes the union to ques-
tion the fundamental validity of all standards and to look with extreme dis-
favor on their imposition U:.on its members. Another fault in its aoplica-
tion that closely parallels this is the employment of time study men who
are not well trained and fully acquainted v;ith the problea.3 of the textile
industry. As is the case with other unions voicing this sa-ne objection,
the Textile 'Vorkers Union feels that no one who is not completely familiar
with the intimate details of production is capable of obtaining equitable
standards. (1'
The criticisia of management's attitude implied by the claim that
it purposely excludes pertinent considerations in the determination of
standards becomes overt in the union's discussion of allowances. On this
point it is criticized openly by the union for niggardliness in the allow-
ances and tolerances used in determining standards.
Recognizing that time studies will be used despite its opposition,
the union has developed a time study procedure v;hich incorporates in it an
extensive system of safeguards to insure the most complete collection of
data possible. It urges that its locals insist that management make its
studies in accordance with this recommended method so that the workers will
suffer a minimum of hardship from time standards. (2)
Acting on its conviction that management's omission of many per-
tinent factors surrounding the execution of machine tending jobs contributes
much to the inaccuracy of standards, the union proposes that its locals re-
1. Union Procedure in Case of i.!anagement Time Study
,
p. 2.
2. Ibid., P. 2.
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quire management to submit an exhaustive survey of the job and its sur-
rounding conditions before the time study is made. By enabling the union
to pick out errors and omissions in the company's specifications of stan-
dard conditions and job elements, the report aids in preventing the study
from being incomplete or made under unrepresentative concitions—both of
which inevitably lead to inaccurate standards.
The information deemed necessary to make this survey com^jlete
may be divided into two sections. The first is an outline of all work du-
ties at the machine, including the duties of all workers who tend or ser-
vice the machine. The other and more exhaustive section is a detailed spe-
cification of the job being studied. This specification contains all de-
tails of the job in question and the outside factors that effect its per-
formance. In this latter category falls the machine data, which includes
the type of machine, speed, standard efficiency, mechanical characteristics,
in fact every detail concerning the machine that could influence the stan-
dard. The same is true of the data on materials and materials handling un-
der which falls the size and weight of the units of raw material, its char-
acteristics, where it is stored prior to use, how the finislied product of
the operation is handled, and -/here it is taken. Recognition of the tre-
mendous influence that ati^ospheric conditions have over the ease. with which
the materials are worked impels the inclusion of this data in the specifi-
cation.
In addition to these items the more basic factdiSl of the operation,
the job elements and their methods of performance, and the data on supple-
mentary workers, are included in this section. As far as the actual job is
concerned, each element should be itemized in the greatest x-ossible detail
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reg.ardless of whether it is a regular element of the cycle or a jjiiscel-
laneous one, with the method and quality of performance of each one. Be-
cause of the interdependence of the various jobs on a crew served machine,
a record of the work aleaents—their time values, frequency of occurrence,
and effect on the job in question if not -erforoied proraptly—of complemen-
tary workers is particularly in order to define exactly the work content of
the job being studied and to discover the need for s.ecial delay allowan-
ces. (1)
After obtaining these specifications it is felt that the union re-
presentative should make an independent survey to insure th^Lt the eleLaents
and metl^ods in the job specification conform to actual practice. (2)
In making this survey the point to be verified is that the worker performs
all the duties assigned to hiia by the specification. It is often the case
that jobs only indirectly contributing to production are omitted or done
less frequently than required by the specification because of job pressure.
Correction of this condition prior to the study is essential for the deter-
mination of a true standard. Even more important from the worker's stand-
point is the search made for duties performed by him that are not included
in the job specification, ".'hethsr these duties are actually a part of the
job or not, they shouli be noted and brought to the attention of ^ management
before the study is undertaken. In the event that they are declared to be
no part . of the job being studied, the worker should be taught how to elimin-
ate them; if ajudged integral parts of the job, they should be included in
1. Why the Workload Problem in the Textile Industry
, p. 9-
2. Handling 'Vorkload Complaints
,
p. 10.
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the specification. Regardless of their eventual status, their unrecog-
nized presence works to the disadvantage of. the worker since the time needed
for then will not be included in the standard.
Having established the exact elements that must be accounted for,
the next phase of the union's survey is concerned with the performance of
these elements. Since the method of performance has such a powerful in-
fluence on the time required for each element, the worker's execution of
each of these is checked for its adherence to the method prescribed by
management. Any variance from this method is thus brought to the fore and
either adopted as an improvement or rejected, in this latter case the worif-
)ter is aught the approved method. Whichever course is chosen, the union
requires that a standard method be designated and the ¥/orker given suf-
ficient time to become reasonably adept in this method before the study is
made.
The influence of element performance is not restricted to that
exerted by the method of performance. An equally important factor in de-
termining the time required for a job is the pattern of performance. The
union, recognizing that a vast difference exists between the time require-
ments of a random performance and a c;^ical one, considers careful descrip-
tion and close adherence to the method of job performance a necessity.
As in the case of element performance, it feels that a reasonable period
of re-education should be allowed workers using unapproved element patterns
before the standard is set. Only by thus standardizing the job before tim-
ing is it possible to^ arrive at equitable standards.
The last subject delved into in this pre-time study survey is the
quality of work required. 3y establishing definitely the care or lack of
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care required, it aakes it possible to judge the satisfactoriness of the
workers' performance and to standardize the workers' efforts so that they
v/ill not be penalized for exercizing more care than is necessary. Without
this standardization the workers producing higher than the desired quality
are faced with the proble;'; of meeting a standard that v/as not set for theai,
the very situation that the union is striving to avoid. (1)
At the conclusion of the survey and before any study is made, the
union submits its findings on the discrepancies between the specifications
and actual practice to the company for action. After the necessary adjust-
ments based on this report have been made, the union suggests that at least
one week of the new conditions be allowed to pass before the time study is
made to allow them to become stabilized. In addition to this general pre-
paration, the worker selected for study must also be prepared. He must be
taught any innovations of method that have been adopted, the full extent
of his duties and their standard method of performance, and the quality
standards that he is expected to maintain. Following this instruction
several days should be allowed the worker to become accustomed to any
changes that he may have had to learn. (2)
In choosing the worker to be prepared as the subject of the study,
the union bitterly resists the selection of any but the average ^worker.
It has no faith in the reliability or adequacy of rating or levelling; in
its opinion no method gives less significant results than these. In pre-
ference to their use in those cases where the identity of the average woik-
1. Ibid., p . 10-12.
2. Union Procedure in Case of I.Ianagement Time Study
, pp. 4,5.
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er is disi^uted, it prefers to have two workers timed— one selected by the
company and one by itself. However, since many companies insist on rating
even when the average is timed, the union, to minimize errors from this
source, attempts to have the time study man inform the worker of his rat-
ing immediately after the study in the presence of the union representa-.
tive. (1) This tends to keep the aplied rating factor within reasonable
limits.
Equally specific is the union in its recomiaendations about the
conduct of the time stjdy itself—both as to the number and nature of the
studies and the conditions during the period of study. Expanding its =^enar
al stateLient that the studies should be taken in s fficient number to rep-
resent fully all conditions likely to be found accompanying the jdb, the
union asserts that a truly representative standard can only be obtained by
taking a ". . . full study of different shifts, of various parts of
the department, of various layouts of machines, of good and
bad equipment, of humid and dry areas, of individual motor
and belt driven equipment, etc. " (2)
In connection with this attempt to obtain tiaie standards in which all pos-
sible conditions are represented, it is common practice fcr the union to
set a minimum of two thousand hojrs of study.
With reference to the kind of study that is acceptable, the union
is equally clear. It states positively that the basic studies must be full
eight hour continuous studies in which all of the elapsed time is accounted
for. Beyond this it recommends strongly supplementary machine studies which
record element frequencies and snap-back studies of individual element times
1. Ibid., pp. 6,7.
2. Ibid., pp. 4,5.
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as tests of the adequacy of the basic study.
The anion's concern during the period of actual study is with
the application of the standards and specifications developed previously.
To insure adherence to these, it has developed performance patterns for
both the worker and the company. Shaping the worker's pattern is the gener-
al proposition that he shall do a normal job with normal dilit^ence. Trans-
lated into specific terms this means that the worker is 3Xpectei to perform
all the elements in the specification according to the standards of work
performance laid out for him. Stressing the point that no elements should
be slighted, the worker is cautioned that he should be extremely careful
not to overlook the so-called non-productive duties, the cleaning and ser-
vicing elements in the job, or the essential elements that have been omit-
ted from the specification. In the latter case, these elements should be
performed and then recorded by the worker so that they may be brought to
the attention of the company.
The pattern of activities set for the company during the study
is designed to maintain the job as it is described in the specification.
To prevent any changes, it forbids tiie company to assign complementary work-
ers to perform any task assigned to the worker or to make special prepara-
tions or improvements on standard conditions. The union considers that the
time for positive company action has passed when the study is being made
and that its responsibility is to maintain conditions at the point at which
they were stabilized in preparation for the study.
Still seeking to make certain that no deviations from standard
occur during the study, the union interviews the worker immediately follow-
ing the completion of the study to determine whether there were any unusual
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circumstances that might have affected his performance. This inquiry covers
not only the external factors surrounding the job but also those intrinsic
in tlie worker's physical and mental state. The unearthin;- of these intrin-
sic factors that might have caused the worker to deviate from normal dili-
gence in his work is accomplished by finding out y/hether he felt better
than usual, whether he was tense, jt ",'hether tl.era vfis some other reason
that he was v/orking faster than usual. To learn whether any external fac-
tor might have influenced his speed he is questioned as to the existence
of any unusual condition or extra help. All of this information is care-
fully recorded and held for use when the company announces the time to be
allowed for the job. (1)
In this as in every industry in order to compute the standard
time certain allowances must be added to the levelled time. On the sub-
ject of allov/ances the union takes a positive position as to their use and
minimum duration. Emphasized less because of its general acceptance is the
personal allowance. Five per cent is considered a sufficient allowance fer
attention to personal needs. Fatigue or rest time is the more important
issue as far as the union is concerned. This is so not only because of its
duration, a minimum of fifteen per cent of the day, but also because of the
union's views on its use. A wide divergence of opinion exists-, on this lat-
ter point between the union and management due to their views on its pro-
per use. Management conceives it as a provision to compensate the worker
for loss of production due to fatigue during the latter part of the day and
urges the worker to use it up in continuous production. The union, on the
1. Ibid., p. 7.
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other hand, considers it to be a period during which the worker is to atop
work and rest to recover from the strain of the job. Any other approach
is, to the union, a travesty on the fatigue allowance as well as an un-
econotnic procedure. This latter contention is based Dn the results of fa-
tigue studies that have shown weekly production increases resulting from
the proper use of this allowance. (1)
Exhaustive as the above requireinents are, the union realizes that
they are no guarantee that the time study will be carefully made or properly
interpreted. (2) For this reason they require "pragmatic proof of bhe sat-
isfactoriness of the standard." (j) This proof consists of only one thing,
the ability of the worker actually on the job to carry it and enjoy all the
personal and other time allowances. If he cannot do this, it is considered
adequate proof that the standard is in error. (4)
Since this proof is obtainable only through operating experience,
the union strongly advocates a trial period during which the company may cor-
rect deficiencies that show up under operati^ng conditions and the worker
may test the standard. For this purpose a basic period of four weeks, sub-
ject to extension, is felt to be an equitable arrangement. If at the end
of this period, the orker and the union feel that the standard is not cor-
rect, they then have the right to institute a grievance under the regular
procedure to secure its revision. Failing to get satisfaction at this point,
they may carry their grievance to arbitration for a final s^;ttlement. (5)
1. Handling Workload Complaints
, pp. 12, IJ.
2. Union Procedure in Case Of ^-ianagement Ti^^ Study, p. 8.
5. Handling Workload Complaints , p. 10.
4. Ibid., p. 12.
5. Regulating the Procedure for Handling Clianges in Work Assignments, p.., 10-15.
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Although little mention is made of participation in the deter-
mination of standards, the Textile V/orkers Union's general cnndemnation
of the theory and methods of time study leaves little doubt as to its atti-
tude on this subject. The addition of the union's specific prohibition to
its members never to indicate approval or assume responsibility for the cor-
rectness of a time study sheet allow/s no inference other than its complete
rejection of any sharing in the development of standards. (l) Concerning
itself solely with the protection of its members from excessive workloads
resulting from the use of time study, it rejects all forms of participation,
reserving for itself the right to challenge all standards. The purpose of
its mandates to management is to minimize disputes, and as such are only in-
directly related to the role the union has chosen. To construe them as
signs of tacit acceptance of time study is entirely incorrect.
1. r^nion Procedure in Case of Management Time Study, p. 7»
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VIII CASE HISTORIES OF PRESENT DAY PRACTICES (Cont.)
The United Electrical, Radio, and Machine V-'Prkers of America ( G . 1 . 0 . )
Although the United Electrical, Radio, and ./.a chine v/orkers of
America is definitely op'osed to time study on principle, it tolerates its
use as a practical necessity. This opposition stenis primarily frOiii its ex-
perience that its greatest application has been to cut rates or compel the
oiBrkers to exert undue effort in the execution of their jobs, and secondari-
ly from its recognition of the fallibility of its methods. So firmly en-
trenched are these impressions that the union is convinced that,
"one of the fundamental problems facing the union is that of pro-
tecting our members against unfair tasks set by time studies and
against rate cutting resulting froin the retiming of jobs." (1)
That this is a guiding principle of day/ to day negotiations as well as a
top-level union concept was confirmed by LIr. John L'.urdoch of the New Englaiid
Regional Office of the :"nited Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of Ameri-
ca.
To secure this protection the union reserves the right to subject
all matters pertaining to time study to collective bargaining. Just how
closely it feels it needs to define its position may be seen from the fol-
lov/ing clauses included in its 194? model contract to guarantee that yhase
of the subject is removed from its jurisdiction.
Section 45-
"""he J. E. shall be informed of any proposed time studies.
The Ur E. is not a party to time studies, but it shall have the
right to bargain collectively concerning all matters pertaining
to time studies, including the basic fonnulas used, the choice
1
•
United Electrical Workers Guide to Time Study and Incentive Payment
, p . 49
.
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choice of the operator to be timed, the defining of avarage
conditions, and the deter:.:ining of the levelling factors and
other time allowances.
"The U. E. steward shall have the right to watch all time
studies, and the operator shall have the right to know (how he
was levelled) (the effort rating used) before the time study
man leaves his machine or place of work. The U. E» shall re-
ceive a carbon copy of all time studies.
"An allowance of fo shall be added for personal convenience
to the time allowed for the job; at least shall be added to
compensate for delays of less than minutes duration, and %
for fatigue."
The values for these allowances are deteriulned wholly by bargain-
ing, the union's object being to get as large an allowance as possible.
Although it sets no maximum liiuit on their size, the union does establish
a definite minimum, according to the nature of the -.vork, for th3 fatigue
allo\7apce. By taking the position that the allowances, other than for fa-
tigue, should be graded according to the type of work and working conditions
the union, in effect, sets an indefinite minimum for them as well.
Section 45.
"Individual rates, job rates . . . and production stan-
dards may be challenged under the grievance .Procedure.
Section 47.
"New time values will not be set so that at normal effort
the worker will earn less than previous straight time.
Section 52.
"Within (10) days after the execution of the agreeuierit,
the em:)loyer shall "urnish the U. E* with all job classifica-
tions, job definitions, job rates, and rate ranges for all em-
ployees covered by the agreement . . . Such information shall
be kept up to date.
"
Although the union requires the right to bargain all phases of
the time study, it categorically rejects any sharing of responsibility in
setting the stand-ards. For purposes of bargaining it denies the need for
a staff of trained engineers and time study men, taking the position that
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it can teach its members to determine proper standards empirically v/ithout
resorting to the use of unsatisfactory formulas. These e-apirical rates are
extreniely important since they are the criterion by which the adequacy of
the company's standards are guaged. The ultimate test of acceptability is
whether the worker is satisfied with his standard; it is toward this goal
that all the union's efforts are directed.
In addition to the general treatment of time studies contained
in the contract, the union makes certain specific requirements directed
against particularly vulnerable practices in time study procedure. The
first of these is that only the average employee may be timed. If such a
study is levelled, the union prescribes the use of a five per cent levelling
factor to compensate for the worker's faster pace induced by the nervous-
ness caused by timing. Another requirement is that the selected time shall
be the arithmetic mean of all the readings from several timings of the op-
eration, and that deviation from this practice shall be sufficient grounds
for rejection of a standard that is unsatisfactory. Relative to the in-
clusion of all the readings, the union is of the opinion that arbitrary
rejection of seemingly abnormal times indicates that the time study results
are being neglected in favprof the engineer's opinion. Any s ich action
casts considerable doubt on the validity of the resultant standard.
Because of the difficulties involved in describing elements ac-
curately, the practice of using synthetic time studies Is frowned upon.
It is considered too prone to inaccuracies and misuse.
Rating and levelling, in addition to their cover .-.ge in the general
time study clauses, are given consideraule special attention because of the
ease with which they may be employed to the disadvantage of the worker.
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They are so well adapted as camouflage for screening unjustified standard
reductions that rigid control of their use is considered essential for the
proper protection of the worker. This control consists of preventing in-
discriminate restudy and of insuring that regardless of time study res Jilts
the worker's rates are not cut unless there has been a really significant
change in the job. (1)
Section 44.
"T'o job shall be retimed unless requested by the 'J. E* , or
unless substantial changes of method have been uiade, and at
least 25"^^ of the operation has been changed. Only that part of
the job which has been substantially changed xay be retimed.
Section 46.
"Recorded or standard time values . . . shall not be cut
unless tliere is a substan/tial change in the job. Adjustment
may be made only in that operation of the job which has been
sub stajntially changed, subject toigrievance procedure.
Observance of these safeguards is by no means a guarantee that
the standard will be accepted by the union. The -^act that a Vi'Orker is un-
able tc^omplete his o eration within the standard time allotted with the
exertion of average effort is considered proof that the standard is incor-
rect, regardless of whether the company has adhered to the t^rescri ed pro-
cedures, or that the company has failed to maintain job conditions set forth
in the job specification. In either event, it is considered imperative that
the standard for the job be voided and a new study made. (2) T^his atti-
tude summed up by the unions s.atement that "at all times the company must
justify its time studies" is the essence af" Its position on standards. What-
ever acceptance is given them represents a bow to the inevitable, not a change
of position.
1. Ibid., p. 68.
2. Ibid., p. 70.
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The Intsrnational Ladies' Garment Workers Union (a.F» of L. )
Diametrically opposed to the opinions on tioie standards and the
desirability of participation in their establishment held by labor as a
v.'hole are those of the International Ladies' Garment Workers. This disparity
may, in a large part, be attributed to the union's traditional policy of
experimentation with progressive collective bargaining tecrmlques in the
furtherance of labor-management cooperation. Siiice its inception this
union has pioneered many practices that were originally shunned and later
embraced as standard practice by labor. (1)
Recognition of the need for experimentation and organized techni-
cal knowledge in this field has been the natural result of its experience
in/collective bargaining. The recent increase in the use of production stan-
dards has reinforced the union's conviction that it must take an active part
in this sphere of management's activities. Two basic reasons brought the
union to this conclusion, the first of these was the realization that the
teC' niques involved were sufficiently unreliable to warrant careful obser-
vation in order to prevent serious errors, and the second was the apprecia-
tion that, despite these weaknesses, time standards could be an aid in the
promotion of industrial efficiency, which would benefit labor as well as
management if proper precautions were taken. (2)
To enable the union to act intelligently on these conclusions an
industrial engineering department was organized by the International Ladies'
Garment Workers Union in 19^1 with two major objectives. The first of
these was to "assist in improving the manufacturing techniques and operat-
1. Gomberg,the Relationship Between Unions and Engineers," p. 425.
2. Gomberg, "Union Interest in Engineering Techniques!? p. 556.
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ing methods of all branches of the industry in which our
worker's earnings are intiisately ' bound. " (1)
This objective was adopted not in the spirit of altruism as might be in-
ferred from isolated consideration but as a practical necessity to keep
the manufacturers sivent so that the job sources would not be dried uy.
Its goal was to bring all of its manufacturers to a point where they were
operating on a competitive basis thus assuring their continued existence.
The second objective pertained more directly to time standards
themselves; it v/as that the department serve as a central information bu-
reau for determining fair piece prices by recording the production systems
and techniques under which these rates were paid aiid training the person-
nel or locals to judge the quality of time study practices used in deter-
mining rates, and render assistance to locals in their joint studies with
management. (2) Two considerations urged the inclusion of this as one of
the objectives of the new department—the need for labor's viewpoint and
experience in the administratioii of industrial engineering techniques, and
the inherent v;eaknesses of time study due to the lack of refinement of its
methods. (5)
The first of these arose from the union's observatia that fac-
tors vital to the successful application of engineering techniques were
often overlooked either through oversight or for the sake of expediency.
By setting up this central source of technical information and aid, it was
felt that many failures in the use of standards due to these causes could
be averted. By giving the locals access to expert opinions on the validity
1. Gomberg, "The Relationship Between Unions and Engineers," p. 425.
2. Ibid., p. 425.
5* Gomberg, "Union Interest in Engineering Techniqu.es," p. ^59*
I
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of management's methods and systems and providing them with a source of
counter measures to be offered in place of those that were found faulty,
the union v/aa persuaded that it co,»ld do much to improve the quality of
standards. The other consideration that impelled the selection of this
objective was the very real possibility of arbitrary action due to the
presence of a subjective element in the time study procedure. This above
all else motivated the union to press for the right of active participa-
tion and to organize for effective joint action.
Inasmuch as none of the reasons set forth for the establishment
of the department were either unique or of recent origin, it raust be re-
cognized its orgs.!; -zat ion is a refinerient, not an innovation, for the union.
For many years the International Ladies' C-ariiient V/orkers has taken an active
part in the establishment of standards, but never before had the efforts
of the locals been cc^ dinated or aided by a central agency. The same
elements that occasioned this department brought about the individual lo-
cals' participation.
Regarding the technical v/ealmesses of time study methods, one of
its most frequently used arguments for labor participation, the union is
both specific and detailed. Starting from the source of the data, the work-
er and his equipment, the union challenges the practice of considering the
standard obtained from time study to be an absolute value. It finds it im-
possible to believe that the standard is uiore than a relatively accurate
approximation in viev; of the practical impossibility of bringing under com-
plete control suck vital factors as the exact techniques used by the opera-
tor studied, the consistency of tools and a^uipment furnished, and the varia-
tions traceable to the measuring instruments utilized, to say nothing of the
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physiological and psychological effect of the standard on the worker and
the worker on the standards. Although these are aore academic than prac-
tical considerations at the present time, they are offered as fields of in-
quiry which must be exi-l^ed and carefully mapped before standards can attain
any degree of real reliability. (1)
Aside from these academic considerations, there are many tangible
aspects of every-day time study practice which the union challenges. One
of the more basic of these is the Jegree of accuracy obtainable with a stop
watch, especially in the timing of short elements . Its doubts on this score
"were reinforced by an experiment performed in the New York University indus-
trial engineering laboratory in which the arithmetic mean of the readings
of seven competent time study men deviated thirteen per cent from a true
value of a 2.50 minute element. To the union this indicates a complete
breakdown of the watch in this range. (2)
Arising as a natural consequence of this demonstration is the
union's complete scepticism concerning the use cf the selected minimum as
the representative time for an element of short duration. The average of
an unreliable arithmetic mean and a minimum reading which may be an aberra-
tion of the watch, the observer, or both has no claim to representativeness
in its opinion. Even with elements whose duration places thenu within the
range where the error in the arithmetic mean is likely to be insignificant,
the statistics of this method are impossible to justify—no sampling test
will sustain a value obtained with this method. As far as this union is
1. Gomberg, "The ''rri.o-\ Looks at .Management Engineering*"
2. Gomberg, "The Relationship Between the Unions and Engineers," pp. 427,428.
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concerned, the most representative walues will be obtained through the use
of the simple arithmetic mean of all the rc-adings, assuming that the sample
taken is large enough to give it statistical validity. The preference shovm
for this method is based on the statistical law that states that as the num-
ber of readings increase the typical value vdll approach the mean. (1)
Similar to the concern for the treataent of the raw data is that
shown for the statistical treatment of the basic data used in assignment of
values for the contingency allowance. (2) The problera here lies in the
fact that despite the existence of a statistically valid method of arriv-
ing at this allowance, the ratio-delay method developed by R. L. :.:orrow, the
usual allowance is a pure estimate with little or no matliematical backing.
Thus in order to asaure itself of its adequacy, the union feels obliged to
inspect the data and computations used in arriving at it. This, however,
is much less satisfactory than the use of the ratio-delay method which re-
moves the possibility of arbitrary and unreasonable allowances. (5)
Its continued failure to obtain its widespread adoption has forced the union
to exercise constant vigilance.
Less subject to exact meaaurement and therefore more controversial
than the contingency allowance are those for personal needs and fatigue.
This is particularly true of fatigue aijout which there is aliiiost a complete
lack of knowledge. (4) Being aware of this situation the union asserts that,
in view of this paucity of knowledge, unilateral determination of rates is
impossible and that the workers must have a voice in their development.
1. Ibid., p. 427.
2. Gomberg, "Labor Examines Time Study Methds."
5. Gomberg, "The Relationship Between the Unions and Engineers," p. 427*
4. Ibid., p. 428.
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If any additional justification for this opinimis needed, it may be found
in the v/idely varying standards obtained by using the different methods for
assigning this allowance that have come into existence because of the absence
of sufficient knowledge of fatigue and the physioligical needs of the work-
er. (1)
As real as these sources of error are, their importance pales
when the errors inherent In the methods of levelling are considered. Prompt-
ing this evaluation is the union's belief that the errors due to the former
causes can be corrected by modifications in the procedures v/hereas those
attributable to levelling can be remedied only by a complete revision of
the method. The present methods of levelling, depending as they do on the
time study observer's comparison of a worker with an ambiguous, hypotheti-
cal average worker, are too subjective fr the union to feel much faith in
their adequacy. Jntil such time as this average man is reduced to defini-
tive statistical terms or a new method is introduced, it will continue to
maintain its position that there should be no unilateral development of
standards regardless of improvements in other phases of time study. It
feels that in so subjective a procedure the workers who are intimately ac-
quainted with the operation being studied should be uiven the right to level
jointly with the observer. In this way injustices and their inevitable com-
panions, '-vage disputes, will be reduced to a minimum. (2)
Despite the fact that the International Ladies' Garment Workers
Union is cognizant of the ^^erious shortcomings of present time study methods,
1. Gomberg, "Labor Examines Time Study Methods."
2. Ibid.
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it does not reject it. On the contrary, it advocates its use. The ex-
planation of this paradox is that while the union is porfectly av;are of
these weaknesses, it is equally aware of the absence of a superior .uethod
of establishing a reasonable day's work. This acceptance is by no means
unqualified. (1) To prevent these limitations froia working to the detri-
ment of the workers and to establish a logical basis for bargaining, it
insists that it is absolutely necessary for the union to take part in the
establishment of standards. (2) That this may some day be unnecessary is
envisioned by the union, but *ith the present severe limitations of knowl-
edge it has no choice but to reject such a procedure. (5) Tc)o much re-
liance is placed on human judgment to permit any other course. (4)
Two conditions must be met for the proper effectuation of this
policy. The more important of these is that the union supply itself with
trained personnel capable of dealing management's engineers on their own
terms. So unsatisfactory are the usual courses in time study available to
union personnel that properly equipped time study stewards can only be as-
sured if the union undertakes their training itself. 3y this means alone
can it be assured that these men v;ill be capable of evaluating management's
methods critically and meeting management on its own level. (5) Experience
has de.aonstrated repeatedly that unless this is done the training that these
people receive is so superficial that they are little more than time study
clerks with insufficient Icnowledge to examine the methods critically. Lack-
1. Ibid. ..
2. Gomborg, "Union Interest In Engineering Techniques," p. 557*
5. Gomberg, "The Relatiohship Between the Unions and Engineers," p. 428.
A. Gomberg, "Union I terest In Engineering Techniques," p. 565.
5. Ibid., p. 565.
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ing this capacity, their usefulness to the union is negligible since it is
inevitable, given a certain set Qf assumptions and a clerical procedure,
that they arrive at the saiae standard as laanagement . It is only when stu-
dies made independently of management, with methods considered adequate by
the union, are available that a proper basis for bargaining rates is se-
cured. (1)
The second prerequisite is that employment be conditioned by mem-
bership in the union. Without this, the union is faced with a situation
where any constructive action places its existence in jeopardy. This
threat to its existence arises from the ability of discontented members,
who have resigned from the union, to regain on their jobs and work toward
the destruction of the organization. To forestall this eventuality, the
International Ladies' Garment ?('orkers regard a strong security clause as an
absolute necessity. (2)
Fundamental to this v/nole question of participation in time study
and the motivating force behind all its work on this subject is the union's
firm conviction that its principal concern is the promotion of the worker's
welfare. Because unilaterally determined staridards are a threat to their
welfare, its policy includes joint determination of standards as e means
of neutral iz>ifi.ng this threat. (5)
1. "Sconomic Fundamentals of Collective Bargaining."
2. Gomberg, "Union Interest in Engineering Techniques," p. 564.
5. Gomberg, "The Union Looks at Management Engineering."

IX CONCLUSION
The vast "jaajorioy of unions are not convinced that present day
tine study techniques are the raeans of arriving at the production quanti-
ties that can be reasonably required of their members. Aside fron all
historical antipathy toward time study, which is by no means a minor
determinant of labor's attitude, there are sufficient tangible faT^a" ^'^^^
methods of determining time standards to enable labor to develo.^ a strong
brief for its case. Assuming management's willingness toset equitable
standards, a situation which is not always the case, even then, the de-
partures from objective procedures necessitated by the absence of such
means for determining fatigue allowances, reducing data to terms of the norm-
al worker, and the various other allowances t?iat are not readily com^.uted
by statistical means are eloquent spokesmen for labor's contention t?iat
unilateral determination of standards is no way to obtain equitable tasks.
V/ith the exception of those unions which have been able to exclude the use
of standards entirely, it is generally agreed that soiiie jurisdiction over
them is es:2ential. At this point the unanimity of labor on the subject of
time standards comes to an end. The variety of plans devised to gain this
jurisdiction over time study methods and standards is almost as great as
the numberof organizations faced with the problem. V/idely divergent as the
individual measures are with respect to their details, close examination of
these means shovvs that in general the devices adopted may be grouped into
two generalized categories. It is from these that the pattern of labor re-
actions becomes apparent.
The first and most densely populated category is that which in-
cludes tiie multitude of plans which accept time standards passively, indi-
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cating this acceptance either by not prohibiting thea or by including a
vague staten-ent of acceptance in agreements with management or statements
of union policy. In either case this acceptance has been surrounded by
restrictions so as to guard against the imposition of unreasonable stan-
dards.
Within this group, no atteuipt is made to follov; a constructive
course with respect to standards. As visualized by those who accept tiae
standards passively, their function is one of censorship. 3y permitting the
standards to be created and just reserving to themselves the right to cri -
ticize and reject, they feel that their responsibility on the subject is
discharged. Taking the position that they do concerning the limits of
accuracy attainable with present day methods, this function is really the
only one which is consistent with their views. Certainly, with the grave
doubts that they voice, aiding in imposition of standards; v/ould be a high-
ly inconsistent policy to follow.
The specific bases for these doubts are legion. The possibilities
of human and mechanical error and of duplicity on the part of management,
the use of incorrect statistical procedures, the realization that vital
elements are neglected either through lack of a detailed understanding of
the operations studied or the refusal of the authorities to recognize their
pertinence, the inconsistencies in standards attributable to the use of dif-
fereiit methods of obtaining raw data—all of these specific causes of in-
correct standards are put fidrth as grounds for their conditional acceptance.
Forceful as these causes may be, tlieir significance pales before the prime
cause of labor's discontent with time standards—levelling. This above all
else has prevented an unqualified acceptance of time study. I!o union, even
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though convinced that the other faults are ^rrectable, is willing to re-
linquish all control of the results of a technique requiring so question-
able a mechanism as this.
This group finds it impossible to reconcile the claias that manage-
ment makes for its accuracy with the ;Tesence of a purely su'. jective deter-
minant of standards. It is felt that roreal faith can be placed in a tech-
nique vjhich relies even partially on persnal judgment. Far too much depend-
ence is placed on intangible thought processes, imposoible of verification,
for any other attitude to be entertained by it. How, it asks, can any whole-
hearted reliance be placed on a technique whose most avid pro^-onsnts are
unable to claim less than a five per cent error steuiming from this factor
alone? (l) Reenforcing the arguments on this point still farther are
Ralph Fresgrave's stateu^ents that althOo..gh levelling meets the demands of
expediency, it is impossible to rationalize convincingly. (2)
Dropping the assumption that this device is used with absolute
integrity further strengthens the arguments for retaining some form of con-
trol over standards. This step in the determination of standards lends it-
self exceptionally well to manipulation because «e the impossibility of veri-
fication. Too often has labor been su.;ject to unethical treatment for it
to ignore this possibility. Even in the case of the Cleveland, garment in-
dustry experiment, where a high degree of cooperation was achieved, it was
found necessary to engage an engineer to represent each side. Probably the
most overt in its ob-^'ection on this ground is the i'nited Electrical Workers
1. Barnes, Ivlotion and Time Study
, p. 277*
2. Presgrave, Dynamics o"' Time Study
, p. 85.
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'.vhich states flatly that levelling can be and is utilized as a oieans of
keeping rates low.
The major problem facing the proponents of passive acceptance is
not the justification of their attitude, but rather the execution of their
censorship function. Should they restrict themselves merely to passing
judgment* the cov.ipleted standard or sho .Id they become involved in the re-
gulation of the methods employed in arriving at these standards? That is
the question facing every labor group in the category that reaches this
pint in its consideration of standards. The responses to it are ex'>.remely
heterogeneous involving a wide range of regulatory activities.
Many, feeling that their only concern is with the justice of the
standard as it is finally applied, wait until the completed standard is of-
fered to them for review before taking any steps to insure its equity. A
common procedure utilized for the testing of the standard is to subject it
to a trial period during which time the worker's average wage is guaranteed
him regardless of his ability to meet the standard. The final acceptance
of the standard depends on the worker's demonstrated ability to produce at
the rate specified by the standard. Unsatisfactory rates in this, as in
every other case, are subject to collective bargaining procedures.
A similar but less formal method of protecting the worker from
excessive tasks is to allow all standards tO'be put into effect subject to
collective bargaining if they prove burdensome. Unsatisfactory rates may
be prevented either through the regular grievance channels, or as in some
cases, through special channels set up for this particular purpose. V/hich-
ever of these three methods is chosen, the final action is the same—all
standards found to be in error are brought up for discussion ajid '3d iusti^ent
.
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Others, believing that the number of unacceptable standards can
thereby be reduced, concern themselves v;ith the methods by which the stan-
dards are reached. Dnly,ho?/ever, to the extent of setting up ir.inimum re-
quirements that i-iust be met in the development of the standard do these
unions become involved with the mechanism of time study. Specifically, the
pursuit of t?iis policy leads them to state the level at which the standard
should be set \7ith relation to the normal worker's output, the time that
should be spent in making a study, the conditions which should exist daring
the period of ti-aing, the circumstances under which retiming should be under-
taken— in fact, any detail that would affect the final result is considered
to be a legitimate subject forthis type of control. Although the group as
a whole covers practically every apsect of time study, the degree of thorough-
ness of the individual union is extremely variable. Some take great pains
to cover every possible contingency while others are satisfied with set-
ting the level below which the finished standards shall not go.
Irrespective of the course they follow, the object of all ..he
unions in the group is identical. Whether they do nothing more than make
provision for Protesting the standard or prescribe minimum requirements of
an exhaustive list of conditions, their whole object is to safeguard their
membership from hardships resulting fromthe imperfection of the time study
technique.
The second and much more sparsely populated category includes
those unions advocating active participation in the determination of stan-
dards. Only one union. The International Ladies' Garment '.Yorkers, has bi-
lateral determination of standards as a general policy. All other instances
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have been the result of decisions niade at the local level, arising from
special circumstances and being li^aited to the particular local union in-
volved. This union, unlike any other, has developed a methcid of dealing
with standards that entails its active participation in their creation.
To insure effective action in this field, it has orgai-ized a manage:-ent
engineering department to v/hich research on and supervision of standards
is assigned ac a major function. 3y keeping abreast of management in this
field, it feels that it can lend sufficient aid to individual locals, who
are directly in contact with problems, to enable them to reduce to a mni.::Ua
the risk of being subjected to inequitable standards.
Although this type of program is unique, it is neither the pro-
duct of naivete or false reasoning. Certair.ly, no union is more familiar
with the weaknesses of time standards. For years it has been ex.-osing the
unfair and erroneous practices indulged in by time study men. Taking in-
to consideration all of the reasor^s that have imt'elled the al.::Ost unanimous
advocacy of passive acceptance, the International Ladies' Garment V/orkers
Union reached the ci?llusion that their interests could be advanced farther
by active participation than by refusing to assume any responsibility for
the development of standards. Its decision to follow this path rather
than that followed by so many of the unions, is attributable to its dis-
agreement with two conclusions reached by the others. The overwhelming
majority present the fallibility of the techniques used in determining
standards as a Primary reason for rejecting any sharing of responsibility
for them. Antipodally, the International Ladies' Garment V/orkers Union
presents this reason an an important factor in its decision to become ac-
tively involved with them. Recognizing that labor's lack of faith in them
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will not deter their use by managen:ent, its position is that serious er-
rors can be most effectively prevented by stopping them at their source
rather than attempting to elicinate them as they nanifest themselves in
the finished standard. Since only by being at the source can errors be
caught there, active participation is advocated and practiced by this
union.
Further.nore, unlike labor as a whole, it firdf -'.uch potential
benefit in their use, which benefit derives from the increased industrial
efficiency.
The pattern that emerges from the tangle of detail is quite simple.
Such a predominance of labor favors a passive policy that with the minor ex-
ceptions noted, it appears that there is really no significant movemerrt to-
ward any position but that of rejection of any real part in standards is the
course chosen by labor. To go beyond this point is to exceed the limits of
union function and to weaken its position with its rank and file membership.
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